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Foreword 
I am pleased to present this compilation of our research results for the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science Topic-Setting Program to Advance Cutting-Edge Humanities and Social 
Sciences Research, Area Cultivation, “Comparative Energy Policy and Discourse in Japan and 
Germany” during the period from October 2014 to March 2018. 
We are deeply grateful to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for their generous funding of 
our project. We believe that our current results demonstrate our progress in researching the important 
issue of climate and environmental change, policy networks in a comparable perspective, and 
information and communications strategies for communicating policy change through various media 
formats. 
I would also like to thank our qualitative and quantitative research groups for their steadfast endeavors 
before and during the project period. I hope that we will continue our collaboration in research papers 
and printed volumes in this research area. 
Thank you for your support of our project. 
Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki
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Introduction: The CEDP Project 
Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki, University of Tsukuba, Japan 
The Comparative Energy Discourse Policy Project (formal English title: “Comparative 
Energy Policy and Discourse in Japan and Germany”) is a three-year project funded by the JSPS (Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science) Topic-Setting Program to Advance Cutting Edge Humanities and 
Social Sciences Research (Area Cultivation) from October 1, 2014 to March 31, 2018.  
In a broad sense, our project aimed at investigating the relationship between energy policy 
and information/communications structures. Our starting point was a comparative analysis between 
Japan and Germany, using the J-GEPON (Japan Global Environmental Policy Network Survey) created 
by Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka and administered in Japan in two waves, first in the late 1990s and then 
again in 2012-13. A German version of the survey (G-GEPON) was undertaken in the early 2000s, and 
within the CEDP project, a second wave was undertaken in 2016-17.  
Our aims for the project were as follows. First, to examine and investigate the nature of energy 
policy through national comparisons on local, regional, and national levels. We also sought to discover 
actor networks through network analysis that would not have been readily apparent through traditional 
survey approaches. As a second aim, we explored how new media has been used by different 
environmental actors as a communications and information provision tool, and compared aspects of 
new media use with traditional survey data. Finally, through the comparison between Japan and 
Germany, we have sought to uncover the similarities and differences in energy policy in the hopes of 
creating a model that can be used in the future for international comparisons at the country level. Our 
research plan conceptualization is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 CEDP Project Objectives 
Project Funding 
Our project received the following funding from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 
Topic-Setting Program to Advance Cutting Edge Humanities and Social Sciences Research (Area 
Cultivation). 
Policy process
• Discourse
• Attitudes
• Relationships
• Evaluation
Media Prism
• Mass media
• Govt & legislative processes
•Web & social media
Research results
• Text mining
• Content analysis
• Surveys
• Network analysis
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Table 1 Project Funding 
Period Funding 
October 2014 to March 2015 1,450,000 yen 
April 2015 to March 2016 3,391,000 yen 
April 2016 to March 2017 3,196,000 yen 
April 2017 to September 2017 3,126,000 yen 
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Analysis of the Policy Network for the “Feed-in Tariff Law” in 
Japan  
Evidence from the GEPON Survey1
Sae OKURA 
Leslie TKACH-KAWASAKI
Yohei KOBASHI
Manuela HARTWIG
Yutaka TSUJINAKA 
Energy policy is known to have higher path dependency among policy fields and is a critical 
component of the infrastructure development undertaken in the early stages of nation building. Actor roles 
are firmly formed, making it unlikely that institutional change can be implemented. In resource-
challenged Japan, energy policy is an especially critical policy area for the Japanese government. In 
comparing energy policy making in Japan and Germany, Japan’s policy community is relatively firm, and 
it is improbable that institutional change can occur. 
The Japanese government’s approach to energy policy has shifted incrementally in the past half 
century, with the most recent being the 2012 implementation of the “Feed-In Tariff Law” (Act on Special 
Measures Concerning Procurement of Renewable Electric Energy by Operators of Electric Utilities), 
which encourages new investment in renewable electricity generation and promotes the use of renewable 
energy. Yet, who were the actors involved and the factors that influenced the establishment of this new 
law? 
This study attempts to assess the factors associated with implementing the law as well as the roles of 
the relevant major actors. In answering this question, we focus on identifying the policy networks among 
government, political parties, and interest groups, which suggests that success in persuading key 
economic groups could be a factor in promoting the law.  
The strength of our research lays in our focus on political networks and their contributing mechanism 
to the law’s implementation through analysis of the political process. From an academic perspective, 
identifying the key actors and factors may be significant in explaining institutional change in policy areas 
with high path dependency. Close examination of this issue also has implications for a society that can 
promote renewable and sustainable energy resources.  
Introduction 
      Since the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011, energy policy has become a 
hotly debated policy field throughout the world. Particularly in Japan, the discourse concerning energy 
policy has evolved into multiple policy trajectories with competing preferences. On one hand, there are 
assertions that even though Japan experienced a major accident involving nuclear power, policy 
concerning nuclear power has not evolved into complete de-nuclearization. Proponents of this policy 
who are concerned about maintaining Japan’s economy claim that there is a need for Japan to re-open 
1 Originally published in the Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, 15:1, 41-63, April 2016. Permission
was received from the Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia to include this paper in our research results 
compilation. 
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the nuclear energy power plants that were shut down shortly after the March 11, 2011 nuclear accident 
at the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant. On the other hand, there are critics of this policy line 
who advocate serious consideration of the development of safe, non-nuclear energy resources and who 
assert that expanding new sources of energy will provide tremendous benefits to the country in the 
future. 
      From a theoretical point of view, among the various policy fields that are intrinsic to creating 
national policies, energy policy is arguably the most important and is said to have a higher path 
dependency compared to other policy areas (Kuper and van Soest, 2003; OECD, 2012, Kikkawa, 2013). 
Determining energy policy, which is strongly connected to a nation’s economic growth and political 
stability, requires inputs from multiple actors, identifying current energy needs, and forecasting future 
requirements. Yet, despite the possibilities for fluid and abrupt change owing to extenuating 
circumstances, actor roles, such as those played by interest groups, are firmly formed, making it unlikely 
that institutional change can be implemented (Hartwig et al., 2015). 
      In resource-challenged Japan, energy policy is an especially critical policy area for the Japanese 
government. In comparing energy policy creation in Japan and Germany, where the accident at the 
Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant had a major impact on energy policy, the range of actors in 
Japan’s policy community is relatively stable (Hartwig et al., 2015). Furthermore, the Japanese 
government’s approach to energy policy has shifted incrementally in the past half century, with the 
most recent being the 2012 implementation of the “Feed-In Tariff Law” (Act on Special Measures 
Concerning Procurement of Renewable Electric Energy by Operators of Electric Utilities), which 
encourages new investment in renewable electricity generation and promotes the use of renewable 
energy. Yet, who were the actors involved and the factors that influenced the establishment of this new 
law? 
This study attempts to assess the factors associated with implementing the law as well as the roles 
of the relevant major actors. In answering this question, we focus on identifying the policy networks 
among government, political parties, and interest groups, which suggests that success in persuading key 
economic groups could be a factor in promoting the law.  
1. Background of renewable energy in Japan 
(1) Legal framework promoting renewable energy in Japan
Japan’s energy policy is regulated under the Basic Act on Energy Policy (promulgated in June 2002)
that was enacted in order to ensure basic policy for energy resource utilization, and each energy resource, 
including nuclear energy and renewable energy, is regulated under this law. 
      In addition, utilization of renewable energy resources is regulated under “Sophisticated Methods of 
Energy Supply Structures” which aims at promoting the use of the renewable energy resources by 
energy supply companies. Renewable energy includes non-fossil energies that can be used sustainably 
(Article 2.3). More specifically, solar energy, wind power energy, low-head hydro power, geothermal 
energy, aerothermal energy, earth thermal energy, and other types of renewable energy resources are 
included under this law (Decree Article 4). 
      New energy types that refer to one of the renewable energy resources are regulated under the “Law 
Concerning Special Measures to Promote the Use of New Energy (New Energy Law)” which aims at 
promoting the use of new energy resources that are comparably not as widespread. Due to their relative 
novelty and development costs, it is disadvantageous for energy companies to invest heavily in these 
resources at this time because of the high costs in supplying such resources initially borne by energy 
supply companies. More specifically, such new energy resources defined under this law include solar 
energy, wind power energy, solar thermal application, temperature difference energy, waste power 
energy and biomass energy. 
(2) Historical Background
Figures 1 and 2 show shifts in domestic demand for primary energy supply in Japan. As Figure 2
shows, fossil energy resources, such as crude oil, coal and natural gas, have been used traditionally as 
the main energy resources in Japan. For example, crude oil, coal and natural gas provided 92.1% of 
Japan’s primary energy supply during 2012. On the other hand, renewable energy, such as hydro power 
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and geothermal energy, make up a smaller portion of Japan’s energy supply (7.2% of primary energy 
supply in 2012). As shown, nuclear energy provided only 0.7%, and this low figure is due to the 
suspension of almost all nuclear energy generating plants after the Fukushima Dai’ichi incident in 
March 2011. However, prior to suspending operations in the plants, nuclear power provided 
approximately 10% of Japan’s primary energy supply from the end of the 1980s to 2010. In other words, 
Japan’s energy supply structure has been composed mainly of fossil-fuel energy sources, and nuclear 
energy and renewable energy have been used as a secondary resource base to accommodate any shifts 
in primary energy supply for domestic demand. 
Figure 1: Resource shifts in Japan’s domestic energy supply, 1965 to 2011 (Unit: 1018J) 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2014). The Cabinet Approved the 2014 Annual 
Report on Energy (Japan’s Energy White Paper 2014), Figure 211-3-1 
(http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2014html/2-1-1.html). (Access Date: 2015/09/24) 
Figure 2: Composition shifts in Japan’s domestic energy supply (Unit: %) 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Ed.) (2014). The Cabinet Approved the 2014 Annual 
Report on Energy (Japan’s Energy White Paper 2014), Figure 211-3-1 
(http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2014html/2-1-1.html). (Access Date: 2015/09/24) 
      As shown in Figure 2, since 2011, Japan’s reliance on nuclear energy has decreased dramatically 
(owing to the government’s decision to shut down almost all of the country’s nuclear power plants in 
the wake of the Fukushima Dai’ichi incident. As of the summer of 2015, there was only one nuclear 
plant operating in Japan. 
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(3) Literature Review: Determinants of Japan’s Energy Policies
What kind of factors affect political decisions regarding Japan’s energy policy? In general, energy
supply system has not changed dramatically. One reason may be because energy policy is known to 
have a higher path dependency among policy fields (Berkhout 2002; Kuper and van Soest, 2003; 
Okumura, 2007; OECD, 2012; Kikkawa, 2013) and is a critical component of the infrastructure 
development undertaken in the early stages of nation building. Actor roles, such as those played by 
interest groups, are firmly formed, making it unlikely that institutional change can be implemented. 
Okumura Norihiko suggests that new global energy strategies and modeling based on the path 
dependency and lock-in (Okumura, 2007) may provide some clues as to how energy policy shifts occur. 
The OECD’s Green Growth Studies analysis reports that the energy sector posed a particular challenge 
in the context of green growth due to its size, complexity and path dependency (OECD, 2012: 5).  
Regarding Japan’s energy policy, the features of post-war policy organization in Japan include 
principles of a shared management system, preliminary policy reviews by the ruling political party 
(coalition leader), and a dual system of government administration involving the bureaucracy and the 
political party in power. Among those features, mutually autonomous organization of the ministries 
form the core of what Morita (2000, 103) refers to as the shōchōkyōdōtai (ministerial consortium) 
composed of the bureaucracy, elected politicians who are aligned with specific policy groups, and for-
profit organizations. Able to circumvent the cabinet, this ministerial consortium has exerted a major 
influence on policy-making. Within this system, in particular, Morita (2000, 106) notes that “in the case 
where a new issue is discovered that lies outside existing issue areas, a ‘turf war’ develops which 
multiplies the adverse effects.” Global environmental policy is precisely such an issue. The ministerial 
consortium charged with the objective of protecting the environment finds itself in the position wherein 
it must promote measures that conflict with its influential counterpart composed of industry groups, 
lawmakers, and business administrators. This leads to environmental policy becoming a policy area that 
is polarized between two ministerial consortia. As a result, a conflict structure composed of proponents 
and opponents with competing measures is formed (Kubo, 2012: 135). 
       Kubo Haruka investigated the influence of political restructuring and government reorganization 
since the 1990s on environmental policy in general with particular attention to measures concerning 
global warming. Identifying five factors, including relationships among main actors concerning policy 
formation, adjustment area and stages, the scope of the policy area, the relationship between the 
measures that involve the policy, and policy direction, Kubo examined the presence or absence of policy 
transformation and analyzed the content of such transformation. Kubo found that there was an observed 
transformation in the latter half of the 2000s. Along with expansions of the range of the Cabinet 
Secretariat’s planning functions, there was also change in how inter-ministerial adjustments were 
conducted through an increase in joint committee meetings and joint administration projects. 
Furthermore, transformation was also propelled by the expanding political power of environmental 
NGOs (non-government organizations) and a change in consciousness within the Ministry of the 
Environment. The overall result was a relative reduction in inter-ministry conflict. As such, these 
identified elements led to what could be perceived as a change in policy output (Kubo, 2012). 
In addition, using ozone depletion treaties as a case study, Kubo also explored how obligations imposed 
by international treaties were being fulfilled domestically and analyzed the national implementation 
framework and process. Kubo’s results showed that through the activation of cross-border activities of 
companies and environmental NGOs, each organization’s international network contributed to 
resolving issues. Furthermore, she identified coalesced policy areas occupied by the public and private 
sectors, as well as international and domestic policy areas. 
There has also been research investigating Japan’s energy policy from international perspectives. 
Watanabe Rie analyzed the political process of climate change and energy policies in Japan and 
Germany, and suggests that international progress on the climate change laws and international debate 
progress on climate change have been the major factors in determining Japan’s climate and energy 
policies. She does not suggest that progress has been made in altering Japan’s energy policy. The Liberal 
Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) has been dominant in Japan’s political system from 1955 to 2009 and, 
as a result, political opportunities to make fundamental changes in energy policy have been relatively 
closed (Watanabe, 2011). In resource-challenged Japan, energy policy is an especially critical policy 
area for the Japanese government. Compared to other countries such as Germany where the policy 
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community is more dynamic, Japan’s policy community is relatively stable, and it is improbable that 
institutional change can occur (Hartwig et al., 2015).  
2. Framework and Methodology
(1) Framework 
We assume that direct and indirect connections between industrial and environmental sectors
enhance environmental policy-making processes. Gesine Foljanty-Jost suggests that the German 
policy-making network in 1990s was more tightly integrated than its Japanese counterpart (Foljanty-
Jost 2005). She indicates that NGOs in Japan lacked personnel resources and are not located in 
influential positions in the network. In this paper, we use data from the “Global Environmental Policy 
Network Survey (GEPON2).”2 In order to target our analysis, we focus on the integration of the feed-
in tariff policy-making process.  
      The other perspective in our analysis is flexibility within the policy network. As noted above, the 
Japanese renewable energy policy-making network is considered to be relatively stable and stationary. 
In order to assess if acquiring flexibility might be associated with the enactment of the feed-in tariff 
law, we analyze different types of networks to investigate differences between policy communities and 
issue networks.  
(2) Methodology
We calculated the centrality measures, drew the feed-in tariff policy-making networks, and set
organization-level and sector-level units as vertices. The organization-level units are organizations 
regarded as major actors in global environmental policy. The edges represent daily communication or 
lobbying activities between them. The sector-level units are categories based on legal status and activity. 
We attach more weight to betweenness than degree centrality in order to clarify which actors contribute 
to integration.  
      We drew the networks according to the following manner. The sizes of the vertices is proportional 
to the square root of betweenness centrality. Each edge is weighted by the number of linking 
organizations when we deal with sector-level networks. And vertices are positioned by the 
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm. 
      First, we identified the network that relates to “information” as the “information network” and 
similarly identified “human and material support” network as the “support network.” These networks 
describe the daily exchanges related to climate change and energy policy in general and are best 
understood to be universal networks that do not focus on a particular policy. By comparing the two 
networks, we can measure their flexibility. If the two networks vary considerably, we expect that the 
FIT (feed-in-tariff) policy-making network will be similar to the issue network that can change in 
response to a particular policy (Heclo, 1978; Smith, 1991). In contrast, the results that do not vary 
significantly suggest that the FIT network maintains a fundamentally stable formation similar to the 
political community. 
(3) Data sources3
As noted above, our data source is the GEPON2 Survey. Table 1 shows the proportions of the target
population and response rates received between December 2012 and June 2013. The target population 
for the survey was determined as follows. Within the survey, “organizations that influence policies 
regarding global warming” were positioned as the target population for the survey. Thus, the survey 
was not conducted via random sampling, but rather, used multiple references to identify the 
organizations that were considered to be influential. After this identification process, these 
organizations were used as the target population for the survey. Table 2 shows the five main 
categorizations of organizations. 
2 The “Global Environmental Policy Network Survey II” (GEPON2), directed by Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka of the 
University of Tsukuba, was conducted between December 2012 and June 2013. The respondent rate was 62.2% (target 
population of 172 organizations, responses gained from 107 organizations including political parties, the government, 
interest groups, and civil society organizations. 
3 For further details regarding the GEPON 2 Survey, refer to Kobashi & Tsujinaka (2014). 
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Table 1: GEPON2 Target population and response rates 
Organization type Target 
population 
(N) 
Responses 
(N) 
Response rate 
(%) 
Governmental office 23 17 73.9 
Independent administrative corporation/special 
corporation under civil law 
9 8 88.9 
Party-affiliated/multi-party Diet members 7 6 85.7 
Economic/industrial organization 19 15 78.9 
Public company/business corporation 41 21 51.2 
Environmental NGO 19 12 63.2 
Incorporated foundation 30 15 50.0 
Mass media 13 6 46.2 
Other private organization 11 7 63.6 
Total 172 107 62.2 (avg.) 
Table 2: Indicators used to verify survey targets 
Category Index 
A. Actors, government agencies, or scholars
participating in national and international
policy formation (83 organizations)
Participants in both COP154 and COP175, 
participants in Ministry of the Environment 
(MOE) commission meetings as well as 
parliamentary hearings of related bills, 
representatives from the top five parties in terms 
of legislative seats of the House of 
Representatives.  
B. Actors involved in implementing national
policies for the reduction of industrial
greenhouse gas emissions (26 organizations).
High-ranked greenhouse-gas-emission-
producing organizations according to 
governmental documents, major domestic 
companies with business plans involving 
renewable energy according to news reports in 
the Asahi newspaper and the Nihon Keizai 
newspaper.  
C. Actors, NGOs and mass media participating
indirectly in policies aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (29 organizations)
NGOs with resources and interest in global 
warming, mass media organizations.  
D. Actors considered to be important as
identified by global warming policy specialists
in 1997 (87 organizations)
Organizations that responded to the first 
GEPON survey conducted in 1997.  
E. Other (12 organizations) Researchers‘ judgement. 
4 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held 
in 2009. 
5 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) of the UNFCC. 
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We used the following questions for our analysis. 
Policy community 1: Information network 
      Responses to the following two questions in the GEPON 2 Survey were used to map the information 
network.  
Question 7: With regards to policy responses to climate change, who does your organization give 
information to? (Multiple answers) 
Question 8: With regards to policy responses to climate change, from whom does your organization 
obtain information? (Multiple answers) 
Policy community 2: Support network 
      Responses to the following two questions in the GEPON 2 Survey were used to map the support 
network.  
Question 9: With regards to policy responses to climate change, to whom does your organization give 
personnel and physical support (not information)? (Multiple answers) 
Question 10: With regards to policy responses to climate change, from whom does your organization 
obtain personnel and physical support (not information)? (Multiple answers) 
Issue network 
      Question 35 in the GEPON 2 Survey asked respondent organizations to indicate with whom they 
work with regarding the FIT Law (multiple responses were allowed) from the organizations listed in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Actors involved in the FIT Law 
Actor Actor 
A. Prime Minister’s Office and/or Cabinet
Secretariat
K. Electricity and/or gas industry
B. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) L. Renewable energy industry
C. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) M. Transportation industry
D. Related factions within political parties
and/or parliamentarian coalition
N. Trading companies
E. Ministry of the Environment and/or its
related organizations
O. International NGOs (including their
domestic branches within Japan)
F. Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
and/or its related organizations
P. Domestic environmental NGOs and/or
NPOs, as well as citizens’ groups
G. Japan Business Federation Q. Mass media
H. Japan Association of Corporate Executives R. International organizations
I. Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry S. Foreign governments
J. Manufacturing industry T. Domestic public opinion
Attitude network 
      Responses to the following two questions in the GEPON 2 Survey were used to map attitudes toward 
the FIT Law. 
      Question 33: Within the 2011 FIT Law, promotion of the use of renewable energy resources by the 
government and increasing power rate were crucial issues. What was your organization’s attitude 
towards these issues? 
(a) Did you agree with the government’s promotion of the use of renewable energy resources?
(Response choices: Agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, or not
interested.)
(b) Did you acknowledge the increases in consumer power rates associated with the
12 
promotion of the use of renewable energy resources? (Response choices: Could 
acknowledge, acknowledge to a certain extent, did not acknowledge to a certain extent, 
did not acknowledge, or not interested.) 
Two different organizational categories were used for this analysis. We used the category of Question 
35 to analyze the data with regards to Question 35, and used (a) the legal status and (b) the category 
based on the activities with regards to other questions. 
3. Results6
      As mentioned above, we describe policy community from information network and support network, 
and compare it with issue network with regards to Japan’s FIT Law. In addition, we use the “group 
category” such as National NGO, global NGO, parties, METI and so on to analyze Figure 3, Figure 6 
and Figure 9 while we analyze the institution itself to make Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
(1) Information network
First, we drew the information network from the responses to Question 7 (identifying information
recipient organization) and Question 8 (identifying information provision organization). 
      Figure 3 shows the information network that we drew from responses to these two questions. 
Situated in the center of Japan’s information network are the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), and national NGOs, while economic and industrial organizations (including trade 
organizations, economic organizations, energy organizations, and manufacturing organizations) and 
political parties stand at the periphery. Composed of other actors, such as MOE and media, their 
presence lies between the center and the periphery. We confirmed a strong tie between METI and the 
national NGOs from Figure 3 as well.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the information networks that we drew from the questions above. The colors show 
the four classifications that were formed on the basis of attitudes towards Japan’s FIT Law: Blue denotes 
agreement with FIT group, red denotes disagreement with FIT group, yellow denotes the ministries, 
and gray denotes “no answer”. 
      Situated in the center of Japan’s information network are the ministries and the group that agrees 
with the FIT Law, while those that disagree with the FIT Law are located at the periphery. In other 
words, we confirmed that there was fundamental agreement with regards to the FIT Law between the 
actors who are situated at the center of the information network such as ministries and the ”agreement” 
groups. 
Figure 3: Information exchange (Q7 and 8) 
6 The basic statistics are shown in the Appendix. 
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Figure. 4: Information and attitude network (Q7, 8, Q33a) 
Figure 5: Information and attitude network (Q7, 8, Q33b) 
(2) Support network7
Turning to the policy community support network, we drew the network from the following two
questions: 
      Question 9: With regards to policy responses to climate change, to whom does your organization 
give personnel and physical support (not information)? (Multiple answers) 
      Question 10: With regards to policy responses to climate change, from whom does your 
organization obtain personnel and physical support (not information)? (Multiple answers) 
      Figure 6 shows the support network that we drew from the responses to these two questions. Situated 
in the center of Japan’s support network are METI and national NGOs, and trade organizations are 
relatively centered as well. However, the economic and industrial organizations, such as economic 
organizations, energy organizations and manufacturing organization, political parties, and MOE stand 
at the periphery. We confirmed a strong tie between METI and the national NGOs from Figure 7 as 
well. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the support network that we drew from the questions above. The “agreement” 
groups were positioned at the center of Japan’s support network, while the “disagreement” groups and 
7 The data for the support network includes missing values, and we acknowledge that could provide bias to our result. 
14 
 
ministries lie at the periphery. However, the tie between the “agreement” groups and the “disagreement” 
groups exists, and they are not separated completely. 
 
 
Figure 6: Support network (Q9, 10, Q35) 
 
 
Figure 7: Support network (Q9, 10, Q33a) 
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Figure 8: Support network (Q9, 10, Q33b) 
(3) FIT network
Turning to Japan’s issue network with regards to FIT Law, we drew the network using the following
question: Q35. With whom does your organization work regarding the FIT law? (Multiple answers) 
      Figure 9 represents the issue network that we drew from the question above. Situated in the center 
of Japan’s issue network are METI and MOE, and the national NGOs and global NGOs lies near these 
ministries, while the economic and industrial organizations, such as manufacturing organizations, 
economic organizations, trade organizations, transport organizations and energy organizations, stands 
at the periphery. 
      Our network mapping in Figure 9 indicates that the issue network shows a tie between METI and 
national NGOs and global NGOs, and a tie between MOE and the economic organizations and 
manufacturing organizations. In other words, we were able to confirm a relatively firm tie between the 
economic and industrial groups and the environmental groups, and they are not separated completely. 
Figure 9: Issue network (Q35) 
(4) Comparison
As noted earlier, by comparing the information networks, support networks, and the FIT policy-
making network, we can measure their flexibility. If the two networks vary considerably, we expect 
that the FIT policy-making network will change in response to a particular policy (Heclo, 1978; Smith, 
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1991). In contrast, as there is not a significant variance, our results suggest that the FIT network 
maintains a fundamentally stable formation similar to the political community. 
      Based on the information network and support network, METI and the national NGOs are at the 
center of the network, while economic and industrial organizations are at the periphery. Moreover, the 
actors at the center of the network agree with the FIT law, while cautious actors are at the periphery. 
However, the two different groups are not separated completely and there are ties between METI and 
the national NGOs, as well as between MOE and the economic and industrial organizations.  
      On the other hand, based on the FIT network, METI and MOE are at the center of the network and 
the national NGOs and global NGOs are clustered around them. The economic and industrial 
organizations are farther away at the periphery. Here as well, there are the ties between METI and 
NGOs, as well as between MOE and the economic and industrial organizations. 
      By comparing two networks, we can confirm the FIT policy-making network is similar to the 
information network and support networks that describe the daily exchanges related to climate change 
and energy policy in general in terms of the following two points. First, the network structures are likely 
to be similar; METI and MOE are at the center of the network, and the national and global NGOs are 
around them, and the economic and industrial organizations are more at the periphery. Second, there 
are the ties between METI and the NGOs, as well as between MOE and the economic and industrial 
organizations, and they are not separated completely. These results allow us to suggest that the FIT 
network maintains a fundamentally stable formation similar to the political community. 
      These policy network structures could explain that the reason why the FIT Law was enacted. The 
FIT policy-making network is similar to the information network and support network, demonstrating 
firmness and stability. Moreover, the political actors at the center of the network are in agreement with 
the FIT Law. That suggests that political agreement between actors has been built gradually through 
primary political adjustments such as councils. As a whole, the FIT Law has been an enduring political 
issue during the short-lived DPJ administration (2009 to 2012) and the resurgence of the LDP 
government in the general election of December 2012. This connection to political processes and policy 
formation could explain how the FIT Law came to be enacted after March 2011.  
 
Table 4: Comparison 
  Information network FIT network 
The center METI and national NGOs  METI and MOE  
The middle ― National & global NGOs 
The periphery 
Economic and industrial 
organizations 
Economic and industrial 
organizations  
Attitude toward 
the FIT 
Actors in the center of the 
network agree with FIT 
― 
Other features 
Ties between METI & NGOs, 
and between MOE & economic 
and industrial organizations 
Ties between METI & NGOs, 
and between MOE & economic 
and industrial organizations 
 
4. Conclusion and future directions 
 
      As mentioned above, energy policy fields are said to maintain a higher path dependency. However, 
despite of this fundamental policy feature, the FIT Law was enacted in 2011 in Japan. This study 
attempted to assess the factors associated with implementing the FIT Law as well as the roles of the 
relevant major actors. More concretely, through this comparison, we discovered that the FIT policy-
making network is similar to the information and support networks that describe the daily exchanges 
related to climate change and energy policy. We were also able to measure flexibility. As a result, we 
can confirm the fact that the network structures are likely to be similar and that there are the ties between 
METI and the NGOs, as well as between the MOE and the economic and industrial organizations. That 
the results do not vary significantly suggests that the FIT network maintains a fundamentally stable 
formation similar to the political community. 
      These results could explain that the reason why the FIT Law was enacted. The FIT policy-making 
network maintains similar features—firmness and stability—to those of political communities. 
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Moreover, the political actors at the center of the network are in agreement with the FIT Law. This 
result suggests that political agreement between actors has gradually been built through primary 
political adjustments such as the councils. In the past five years, the FIT Law has been a political issue 
from its inception to its enactment after March 2011. 
      The strength of our research lays in our focus on political networks and their contributing 
mechanism to the law’s implementation through analysis of the political process. From an academic 
perspective, identifying the key actors and factors may be significant in explaining institutional change 
in policy areas with high path dependency.  
In the future, we will continue this line of inquiry with regards to other policy initiatives involving the 
energy sector, including the deregulation of electricity companies (which is set to come into force within 
the next three years in Japan). By assessing the policy networks for individual issues and comparing 
them over time, we believe that we can reveal new dimensions in political relationships and policy 
formation. While this research has focused on close examination of the FIT Law, the wider implications 
suggest a framework for assessing how societies can promote renewable and sustainable energy 
resources. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Network Characteristics 
Information network Support network Information (group) Support (group) Q35 (group) 
Density 0.324 0.090 0.780 0.311 0.515 
Transitivity 0.567 0.266 0.920 0.574 0.726 
Reciprocity 0.724 0.529 0.936 0.703 0.581 
N 59 40 12 12 12 
Appendix Table 2: Means of Centrality Measures (Information Network) 
Category In-degree Betweenness PageRank N 
Ministry 20.385 94.353 0.017 13 
Govt. related 22.333 76.472 0.018 6 
Party 35.500 59.595 0.034 2 
Cross-party 14.000 9.553 0.014 1 
Company 11.857 3.070 0.010 7 
Economic 16.000 18.239 0.016 2 
Industrial 15.000 8.300 0.013 10 
Media 37.000 73.218 0.034 2 
NGO 23.286 15.896 0.022 7 
Foundation 13.833 15.366 0.014 6 
Other 13.667 6.654 0.015 3 
Total 18.814 39.407 0.017 59 
Appendix Table 3: Means of Centrality Measures (Support Network) 
Category In-degree Betweenness PageRank N 
Ministry 1.556 15.162 0.010 9 
Govt. related 9.250 251.651 0.051 4 
Party 0.000 0.000 0.004 1 
Company 6.000 125.896 0.030 5 
Economic 1.000 0.000 0.004 2 
Industrial 2.286 33.452 0.023 7 
Media 2.000 38.000 0.013 1 
NGO 4.750 67.721 0.052 4 
Foundation 3.000 79.093 0.024 5 
Other 3.000 18.475 0.021 2 
Total 3.525 68.700 0.025 40 
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Table Appendix-4: Centrality Measures (Group Level Information Network) 
Category In-degree Betweenness PageRank 
LDP 0 0.000 0.013 
Cross-party 10 0.000 0.117 
MOE 10 0.000 0.109 
METI 11 35.500 0.077 
Economic Org. 7 0.000 0.113 
Manufacturer 8 0.000 0.046 
Energy 10 0.000 0.098 
Transport 7 0.000 0.094 
Trade 7 0.000 0.080 
Global NGO 11 0.000 0.113 
National NGO 11 51.500 0.048 
Media 11 0.000 0.090 
 
 
Appendix Table 5: Centrality Measures (Group Level Support Network) 
Category In-degree Betweenness PageRank 
Cross-party 0 0.000 0.014 
MOE 4 0.000 0.110 
METI 9 14.500 0.250 
Economic Org. 1 0.000 0.032 
Manufacturer 5 17.000 0.116 
Energy 4 0.000 0.100 
Transport 3 0.000 0.095 
Trade 5 16.000 0.130 
Global NGO 1 0.000 0.020 
National NGO 8 44.500 0.092 
Media 1 0.000 0.041 
 
Appendix Table 6: Centrality Measures (Q35) 
Category In-degree Betweenness PageRank 
LDP 7 1.500 0.119 
Cross-party 6 0.000 0.070 
MOE 8 10.167 0.108 
METI 8 18.750 0.134 
Economic Org. 5 0.250 0.082 
Manufacturer 6 1.250 0.082 
Energy 6 0.250 0.086 
Transport 3 0.000 0.052 
Trade 4 0.000 0.057 
Global NGO 4 1.417 0.058 
National NGO 5 3.417 0.063 
Media 6 0.000 0.088 
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エネルギーミックスと経済の強靭性
－国際比較を通した分析－ 
Energy Mix and Economic Resilience: 
An International Comparison 
小橋 洋平 (Yohei KOBASHI) 
白川 慧一 (Kei’ichi SHIRAKAWA) 
本章は、日本のエネルギー政策の基本的な方針であるベストミックスを経済の強靭性という
観点から評価する。日本はオイルショック以降、発電方式の多様化を重視し、原子力、火力、
水力などの電源をバランスよく供給することで「電源のベストミックス」を目指してきた1。 
資源エネルギー庁では定期的にエネルギーミックス（長期エネルギー需給の見通し）が発表
され、全エネルギーに占める原子力、火力、（水力を含む）再生可能エネルギーの目標比率が
示される。エネルギーミックスを一種のポートフォリオと捉えると、化石燃料をはじめとした
エネルギー価格の変動に対してリスク分散の効果があることが期待される。しかし、リスク分
散と危機に対する強靭性（レジリエンス）は区別して考える必要があり、従来のアプローチで
は、リーマンショックや東日本大震災のような突発的かつ広範囲に影響を及ぼす危機への対応
として十分ではないことが指摘されている（Aiginger 2009；藤井・久米・小林 2014）。エネル
ギーミックスはエネルギー基本計画の基軸に据えられており、強靭性も含め多角的な観点から
も評価することに意義があると考える。そこで、OECD 26か国のデータを用いた分析によりエ
ネルギーミックスと経済強靭性との関係を検証する。
1. 研究の背景と目的
日本政府が 2014年に発表したエネルギー基本計画2では、東日本大震災以降、原子力発電
所を停止したことで化石燃料への依存が高まり、その影響がマクロ経済にまで及んでいるこ
とを問題視している。その上で、民主党政権下で一度、見直しが検討された長期エネルギー
需給について、各エネルギー源の特性を踏まえてバランスよく配備することの重要性を唱え
ている。そして、翌年に発表された長期エネルギー需給見通し3では経済と環境の双方に配
1 電気事業連合会 http://www.fepc.or.jp/enterprise/supply/bestmix/（2018年 1月 14日閲覧）. 
2 経済産業省. (2014). エネルギー基本計画. 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/140411.pdf （2018年 1月 21日閲覧）. 
3経済産業省. (2015). 長期エネルギー需給見通し. 
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慮した経済需給構造を目指し、2030年度の一次エネルギー供給比率を再生可能エネルギー
13～14%、原子力 10～11%、天然ガス 18%、石炭 25%、LPG3%、石油 30%程度と見積もっ
ている。 
このようなエネルギーミックスを前提としたエネルギー政策は、化石燃料価格の高騰に対
する経済の安定、エネルギー自給率の改善といった想定される課題に対して一定の効果があ
ると期待される一方で、オイルショックのような突発的かつ影響が広範な危機に対して十分
なアプローチかといえば疑問が残る。Aiginger（2009）はサブプライム危機のようなショッ
クは従来の経済安定を図る施策では対応できず、このような危機に対する強靭性
（resilience）を定める新たな要因を明らかにする必要性を指摘する。また、藤井・久米・小
林（2014）では近年、レジリエンスの概念が世界的に注目を集めていることを指摘し、致命
傷を受けない、被害を最小化する、すぐに回復するという 3つの要因からなると述べてい
る。藤井らは東日本大震災やテロを念頭に、老朽化したインフラの整備やテロ対策など危機
に対する直接的な対策の必要性を唱えているが、このような例に限らず、不測の事態に対す
る強靭性を様々な角度から評価、改善することが大事だと考えられる。
以上を踏まえ、本章ではエネルギーミックスがもたらす経済的な強靭性の評価を目的とす
る。エネルギーミックスと GDPの変動の関係について OECD 26か国の国家間比較、考察を
行う。 
2. エネルギーミックスの狙いと強靭性
2.1. エネルギーミックスを基本方針に据える狙い 
前述の長期エネルギー需給見通しによると、エネルギー政策の要諦は安全性（Safety）、
エネルギーの安定供給（Energy Security）、経済効率性の向上（Economic Efficiency）の 3つ
であり、エネルギーミックスはこの 3つに環境への適合（Environment）も加えて考慮した
総合的な判断として策定されている。具体的な指標としては、原発依存度、エネルギー自給
率（中東依存度）、電力コスト（国民負担）、CO2排出量が挙げられている。以上の複数
の目標を両立する上で、各電源の個性をバランスよく生かすのがベストミックスの趣旨とな
る。例えば、再生可能エネルギーはエネルギー自給率向上、CO2排出抑制に貢献する一方
で、太陽光や風力発電は不安定な出力への投資も含めて電力コストが高いと見られている
（小宮山・藤井 2015）。指標が複数あるという点で違いはあるものの、異なる特徴を持つ
各電源を組み合わせることで目標となる指標の分散を抑えつつ、期待値の最大化を図るとい
う点では金融工学におけるポートフォリオと共通する。政府は上記の指標全てに対して、分
散を抑えつつ一定以上の期待値になるよう電源の配分を決めるという最適化問題に取り組ん
でいるといえる。
実際にベストミックスを算出する方法としては、マクロ経済モデルに基づくシミュレーシ
ョンがある。例えば藤井（2015）では、将来の電力需給について一定の前提を置きながら、
電力需給モデルを線形計画問題として解析するという手法を取っており、その結果をもとに
どの電源構成（エネルギーミックス）が最も適切かを評価している。 
2.2. エネルギーミックスで想定されていない強靭性 
上記の強靭性の定義に照らすと安全性や安定供給といった指標は強靭性に対応する指標と
見なすことができる。電源コストだけを最適化する場合と比べると強靭性に配慮した計画だ
と言える。加えて、ポートフォリオを組むことにより各指標の分散を抑えることができれ
ば、社会、経済に回復が困難となるほどの大きな負の影響が及ぶ確率を下げることにつなが
り、その観点からも強靭性の改善につながる可能性がある。 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/mitoshi/pdf/report_01.pdf
（2018年 1月 21日閲覧） 
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その一方で、エネルギー基本計画や長期エネルギー需給見通しに記載されている内容に従
うと、オイルショックや自然災害、テロといった突発的かつ広範囲に及ぶタイプの危機に対
する強靭性が十分に考慮されていない。原子力発電所の信頼と安全性を高めるという課題は
挙げられているものの、エネルギーミックスが想定すべきオイルショックのような危機に対
してベストミックスを組むという従来の方針以外のものが示されているわけではない。震災
やオイルショックの影響は原発の停止、石油価格の高騰といったエネルギー市場に直接及ぶ
影響だけでなく、被災によってダメージを被った企業とその取引先、被災地の社会、経済的
なダメージ、オイルショックの背景にある戦争などの影響を受ける市場の停滞などの事象が
間接的にエネルギー市場に影響を及ぼしうる。 
Christopher（2004）による強靭なサプライチェーン（Resilient Supply Chain）の考察に基づ
くと、サプライチェーンを通して波及するタイプのリスクに耐えうるかどうかが強靭性の鍵
であり、従来の政策では対応できない問題だとされる。オイルショックを例にとると、エネ
ルギーミックスの議論で取り上げているのは石油価格の高騰が各企業に及ぼす負の影響まで
であり、企業へのダメージとその波及がサプライチェーン上で同時多発的に発生することの
影響までは扱っていないことになる。 
以上の問題はエネルギー基本計画の枠内だけで対処するものではないが、エネルギー政策
に絞って考えた場合でも、エネルギーミックスをエネルギー政策の前提とすることが強靭性
の観点で望ましいことなのかは議論の余地がある。仮に技術革新によって生まれた新たな電
源が強靭性という観点から極めて優れている場合、バランスを度外視してその電源を重点的
に配備する方が望ましい場合も考えられるだろう。この場合、エネルギーミックスという前
提があることでエネルギー政策の柔軟性が失われてしまうという見方ができる。 
ただし、エネルギーミックスが石油価格の高騰が及ぼす影響を緩和することでサプライチ
ェーンに波及する前の段階で一定の抑止力となり、結果的に強靭性の改善に寄与している可
能性がある。エネルギーミックスそのものが強靭性に寄与するかどうかという論点は、エネ
ルギーミックスの正当性を論ずる上で重要であり、強靭性を改善する別の指標が見いだされ
た場合、エネルギーミックスを基本的な方針に据えること自体の是非を改めて問い直す必要
があるだろう。 
 
3. 分析 
 
3.1. 仮説 
以上を踏まえ、本章では以下の 2つの仮説を検証する。簡単化のため本分析では経済の強
靭性に対象を限定する。 
 
仮説 1: エネルギーミックスにより火力発電の割合を低くすると、通常時の GDPの変動を抑
える効果がある一方、戦争や世界的な不況といった危機に対する強靭性には必ずし
も影響しない。 
 
仮説 2: 再生可能エネルギー、原子力の割合の割合を高めると、通常時の GDPの変動を抑え
る効果がある（仮説１と対）。戦争や世界的な不況といった危機に対する強靭性
は、リスクのより少ない再生可能エネルギーの方が高い。 
 
仮説 1に関しては、2.2で言及したように、石油価格の高騰のような直接的な影響を考慮
して設計されたエネルギーミックスでは危機に対する強靭性という点で不十分ではないかと
いうものである。また、仮説 2については石油価格といった市場に直接及ぼす影響とは異な
る観点からの評価となる。 
以上の仮説を検証するため、GDPの変動を被説明変数とする OLS推定を行った。 
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3.2. データ 
分析の対象は、チェコ、ハンガリー、ポーランド、スロヴァキア、バルト 3国、ニュージ
ーランド、スイスを除く OECD 26か国の、1971年から 2014年までの 44年間のデータであ
る。 
石油価格の変動は、英 BP社の Statistical Review of World Energy 20174のデータをもとに、
Crude oil prices（2016年時点での米国ドルベース換算値）の前年からの変動値を使用する。
なお、各国が直面する石油価格は同一であると仮定する。 
各国の GDPの変動およびエネルギー源別発電電力量割合は、世界銀行の World Bank 
Open Data5から得たデータを用いる（表 1参照）。GDPの変動は、2010年米国ドルベースで
の実質値を、2010年＝100となるよう指数化した上で、前年からの変動値を使用する。発電
電力量割合におけるエネルギー源には、再生可能エネルギー（水力を除く）、原子力、火力
（石油、天然ガス、石炭の合計）の 3つを使用する。表 2に各変数の基本統計量を示す。 
戦争や世界的な不況といった危機にあたる年ダミーには、1974年（第一次オイルショッ
ク）、1979年（第二次オイルショック）、1990年（湾岸戦争）、2002年（同時多発テロか
らイラク戦争開始まで）、2008年（リーマンショック）の 5時点を用意した。
表 1 26か国の実質 GDP(2010年＝100)と電源別発電電力量割合（％）、1971年と 2014年
1971年 2014年 
国名 GDP 発電電力量割合(％) GDP 発電電力量割合(％) 
再生 
エネ
水力 原子 
力 
火力 再生 
エネ
水力 原子 
力 
火力 
オーストラリア 29.6 0.5 21.8 0.0 77.7 111.7 7.5 7.4 0.0 85.1 
オーストリア 39.3 0.8 57.5 0.0 41.7 104.4 14.6 66.6 0.0 17.7 
ベルギー 41.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 99.6 103.6 16.6 0.4 47.2 33.5 
カナダ 33.9 0.0 73.2 1.9 24.8 110.3 4.5 58.3 16.4 20.4 
チリ 22.3 0.8 56.4 0.0 42.8 118.5 9.8 31.3 0.0 58.4 
ドイツ 46.3 0.8 4.1 1.9 93.1 106.7 23.0 3.1 15.6 56.7 
デンマーク 48.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 99.9 104.2 55.8 0.0 0.0 41.9 
スペイン 33.5 0.1 51.7 4.1 44.2 95.8 25.9 14.2 20.8 38.8 
フィンランド 35.0 0.0 49.0 0.0 51.0 99.7 18.9 19.7 34.6 25.8 
フランス 41.6 0.5 31.3 6.0 62.2 103.8 5.1 11.3 78.4 4.8 
イギリス 42.3 0.0 1.3 10.8 87.9 108.3 17.7 1.8 19.0 60.8 
ギリシャ 42.4 0.0 22.9 0.0 77.1 82.1 15.3 8.9 0.0 75.6 
アイルランド 17.1 0.0 7.4 0.0 92.6 113.4 21.8 2.7 0.0 75.2 
アイスランド 28.0 0.8 96.2 0.0 3.0 109.9 28.9 71.0 0.0 0.0 
イスラエル 19.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 114.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 98.5 
イタリア 45.5 3.4 31.5 2.7 62.4 96.2 22.3 21.1 0.0 55.5 
日本 35.3 0.0 22.0 2.1 75.9 103.8 6.1 7.9 0.0 85.6 
韓国 5.9 0.0 12.5 0.0 87.5 112.8 1.1 0.5 28.7 69.5 
ルクセンブルク 23.2 0.0 4.1 0.0 95.9 112.0 15.3 5.7 0.0 76.2 
メキシコ 26.8 0.0 46.3 0.0 53.7 112.2 4.6 12.9 3.2 79.2 
オランダ 39.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 99.1 101.8 11.2 0.1 4.0 83.0 
ノルウェー 30.8 0.0 99.6 0.0 0.4 106.9 1.7 96.0 0.0 2.0 
ポルトガル 34.1 1.8 78.1 0.0 20.0 94.0 30.8 30.0 0.0 38.8 
スウェーデン 44.0 0.2 78.2 0.1 21.5 106.3 14.3 41.5 42.3 1.1 
トルコ 20.1 1.7 26.7 0.0 71.7 132.8 4.8 16.1 0.0 79.0 
アメリカ合衆国 33.0 0.0 15.5 2.4 82.1 108.1 6.9 6.1 19.2 67.5 
4 https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of- world-energy.html 
5 https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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表 2 基本統計量 
 平均 標準偏差 中央値 
GDPの変動(2010年＝100とした指数値) 2.027 15.50 1.044 
石油価格の変動(2016年米国ドルベース) 1.707 1.935 1.761 
再生可能エネルギーの発電電力量割合(％) 3.370 5.946 1.249 
原子力の発電電力量割合(％) 12.05 18.48 0 
火力の発電電力量割合(％) 58.52 30.86 58.52 
 
3.3. 結果と考察 
分析結果を表 3、4に示す。表 3の通り、石油価格の変動は GDPの変動に正に有意な影響
があるという結果になった。このことは、石油価格の変動が経済の強靭性を脅かすリスク要
因となっていることを意味する。 
火力の発電電力量割合は、GDPの変動に有意な影響を与えておらず、仮説 1で想定して
いた効果は確認できなかった。また、火力の発電電力量割合と、石油価格の変動、戦争や世
界的な不況といった危機の起こった年ダミーとの交互作用項を入れて再度分析したところ、
表 4の通り、いずれの交互作用項も有意にならなかった。このように、火力発電の割合が高
いからといって、危機に対する強靭性への影響は必ずしも確認できないという結果となっ
た。 
一方で、再生可能エネルギーの発電電力量割合が高いほど、GDPの変動が有意に小さく
なる効果が確認できた。反対に、原子力の発電電力量割合は、GDPの変動に有意な影響を
与えておらず、仮説 2の想定していた効果は確認できなかった。また、表 4にある通り、再
生可能エネルギー、原子力の発電電力量割合と、石油価格の変動、危機の起こった年ダミー
との交互作用項はいずれも有意にならなかったことから、再生可能エネルギー、原子力、い
ずれも危機に対する強靭性への影響は必ずしも確認できないという、仮説 2とは異なる結果
となった。 
以上、分析結果からはエネルギーミックスには、石油価格の高騰を通して引き起こされる
変動に対しては一定の相関がみられ、エネルギー基本計画や長期エネルギー需給見通しで期
待される効果と整合的だが、一方で石油価格では説明できない変動に対しては再生可能エネ
ルギーを除き有意な相関を示さなかった。エネルギーミックスはあくまで計画で考慮される
危機の影響に対してのみ影響を及ぼすものと考えられる。ただし、年ダミーが想定と異なる
相関を示していることから危機による負の影響を適切に捉えることができておらず、この点
を改善する必要がある。 
 
表 3 GDPの変動を被説明変数とする OLS推定 
 係数 標準誤差 
切片  2.038 0.149 *** 
石油価格の変動  0.069 0.005 *** 
再生可能エネルギー -0.038 0.009 *** 
原子力 -0.004 0.003 
火力 -0.001 0.002 
年ダミー その他 （基準） － 
     1974年 -3.711 0.395 *** 
     1979年 -3.782 0.428 *** 
     1990年 -0.490 0.351 
     2002年 -0.090 0.348 
     2008年 -2.795 0.368 *** 
R2 0.186  
修正 R2 0.179  
F値 28.76 *** 
                 ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1 
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表 4 GDPの変動を被説明変数とする OLS推定（交互作用項の追加）
モデル１ モデル２ モデル３
係数 標準誤差 係数 標準誤差 係数 標準誤差 
切片 2.026 0.149 *** 2.038 0.149 *** 2.028 0.155 *** 
石油価格の変動 0.065 0.006 *** 0.069 0.006 *** 0.073 0.010 *** 
再生可能エネルギー -0.037  0.009 *** -0.038  0.009 *** -0.038  0.009 ***
原子力 -0.004  0.003 -0.004  0.003 -0.003  0.003
火力 -0.001  0.002 -0.001  0.002 -0.001  0.002
年ダミー その他 （基準） － （基準） － （基準） － 
1974年 -3.842  0.473 *** -3.665  0.477 *** -3.180  0.898 ***
1979年 -3.818  0.565 *** -3.823  0.543 *** -3.762  0.959 ***
1990年 -0.203  0.446 -0.523  0.437 -1.085  0.733
2002年 0.215 0.446 -0.079  0.432 -0.486  0.759
2008年 -2.773  0.521 *** -2.770  0.450 *** -2.508  0.795 ***
交互作用 再生エネ×石油価格 0.001 0.001 
再生エネ×1974年 0.657 0.510 
再生エネ×1979年 0.380 0.522 
再生エネ×1990年 -0.141  0.150
再生エネ×2002年 -0.082  0.076
再生エネ×2008年 -0.005  0.052
交互作用 原子力×石油価格 0.000 0.000 
原子力×1974年 -0.023  0.101
原子力×1979年 0.006 0.049 
原子力×1990年 0.002 0.016 
原子力×2002年 -0.001  0.017
原子力×2008年 -0.002  0.019
交互作用 火力×石油価格 0.000 0.000 
火力×1974年 -0.008  0.013
火力×1979年 0.000 0.014 
火力×1990年 0.010 0.011 
火力×2002年 0.007 0.011 
火力×2008年 -0.005  0.012
R2 0.190 0.186 0.188 
修正 R2 0.179 0.175 0.177 
F値 17.62 *** 17.17 *** 17.39 ***
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
4 結論と今後の課題 
4.1. 結論 
本章ではエネルギーミックスが経済強靭性に及ぼす影響について OECD 26か国のデータ
を用いて検証した。エネルギーミックスはリスク分散という観点からは一定の効果が期待で
きるが、エネルギー基本計画の基本方針であるにもかかわらず、強靭性という観点からの評
価は十分に行われていない。仮にエネルギーミックスという制約によって強靭性の改善が阻
害されているのであれば、エネルギーミックスを政策の基本方針に据えること自体を見直す
ことも検討する必要があるだろう。その端緒として本章では石油価格の変動で統制した上で
エネルギーミックスと経済の変動との相関を OLS推定によって分析した。
分析結果を見ると、再生可能エネルギーのみが GDPの変動と負の相関を示し、化石燃料
や原子力への依存度低下で強靭性が増すという結果は得られなかった。従来の政策では危機
に対する強靭性という観点で十分ではないという Christopher（2004）の主張に沿った結果と
なった。 
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4.2. 今後の課題 
まず、前述の年ダミーの係数が負または有意ではないことから、危機を表すダミー変数に
ついて改善が求められる。今回は OECDの各国に幅広く影響を及ぼす危機として戦争と世
界的な不況を筆者の判断で選択したが、東日本大震災のような地域が限定される危機も分析
対象に加えるためには、それぞれの国に焦点を合わせ、客観的な指標に基づき危機を選択で
きれば望ましい。また、危機が生じてから経済に影響が及ぶまでの期間についても危機に応
じて異なると考えられるため、個別に分析を行い特定することが求められる。 
また、今回は相関の分析にとどまっており、今回はデータ上の制約が厳しく断念したが、
因果関係の分析に発展させるために時系列分析の導入を検討する。 
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Post 2015 Paris Climate Conference Politics on the Internet1 
Social media strategies of political institutions on the environment in Germany and Japan 
Manuela HARTWIG 
The outcomes of the climate negotiations of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP21) by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the most important since 
the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. With the development of new information technologies 
since the 1990s public awareness of environmental issues has increased significantly and not only civil 
society actors but also political institutions and governmental organizations started to use these new tools. 
The direct communication with citizens, journalists and other interest groups can provide political 
representatives with a powerful tool to shape public agenda. However, political institutions are 
traditionally slow in adapting to new technologies and social media services are dominated by individual 
(one-person) users. Politicians as well as institutions on the Internet must be careful how to facilitate 
communication online to ensure their political legitimacy. How do governmental organizations involved 
in climate change politics use social media? This study focuses on the analysis of the official Twitter 
profiles by the German (@BMUB) and Japanese (@Kankyo_Jpn) environmental ministries and 
contributes to the understanding of how governmental organizations facilitate new information 
technologies in the age of democratic transition. With Twitter data of a seven-month period from the 
beginning of COP21 on November 30 2015 until July 3, 2016, covering three important international 
events related to climate change politics in total, besides COP21, the pre-COP session and G7 summit 
(both in May 2016) the characteristics of social media use is being analyzed. Even though Twitter is more 
popular in Japan, it has not been played an important role in direct communication and information 
dissemination for political institutions compared to Germany. Moreover, while previous research 
conclude institutions would avoid interaction on the Internet, the findings suggest differently.  
Introduction 
      Climate change is one of the most important issues nowadays, influencing political decision-making 
processes that effects various areas and is part of daily discussions. Since the meltdown at the 
Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011, triggered by a 9.0 earthquake-generated 
tsunami at the east-cost of Japan, the energy and environmental politics in Japan and Germany are under 
close public scrutiny. Scholars employ with the question how differences in political decision-making 
processes can be explained. Both countries have strong economic ties, as well as in diplomacy, 
technology and knowledge exchange. On the occasion of the G7 meeting in May 2016 in Toyama, 
Japan and Germany signed a joint statement on bilateral cooperation on the dissemination of low carbon 
technologies towards transformation to decarbonized societies. Both countries recognize their 
1 This paper has been presented at the CeDEM Asia 2016 Conference of the Danube University Krems, Faculty of Business 
and Globalization, Department for E-Governance and Administration, held in Daegu, South Korea, December 7 – 9, 2016, 
and has been published in the conference proceedings. Permission for this reprint has been given by the conference 
organizers. For the purposes of this report, the format of the paper has been adapted to this report’s style format. The content 
and references remain the same as in the conference proceedings. The conference proceedings can be downloaded via the 
faculty’s webpage. Reference: Skoric, M. M., Parycek, P., Sachs, M. (2017). CeDEM Asia 2016. Proceedings of the 
International Conference for E-Democracy and open Government. Asia 2016. Krems: Donau-Universität Krems.  
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responsibility for leading the challenge of realizing a decarbonized society during this century by 
utilizing both countries’ technological capabilities2. 
      While the Abe administration focuses on the promotion of nuclear energy to reduce CO2 emissions, 
Germany is known for its strong environmental and green politics. The environmental ministry of 
Germany was established in 1986 and the green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) was founded in 1980. 
Since 1984 the party is a member of the Bundestag, being one of the major opposition parties and 
experienced the role as ruling party in the coalition with the social democrats (SPD) between 1998 and 
2005. Germany is focusing on promoting renewable energies since the late 1980s, gradually moving 
towards the Energiewende since then. Japanese environmental and green politics is in comparison in a 
different position. The ministry for the environment was established in 2001, being upgraded from the 
status as an agency and environmental issues are no major issues in political campaigns during general 
elections. The green party of Japan was founded in 2012. In terms of environment and energy, securing 
the energy supply and providing a safe infrastructure is one of the main issues. However, since the 
Fukushima accident, the promotion of renewable energies experienced an increase. In 2012 the Feed-
In Tariff law to promote renewable energies went into force. Countries are faced with the challenge to 
keep the global warming under 1.5°C, managing domestic political and social demands in the wake of 
the last economic crises at the same time.  
      The annual conferences held by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are 
significant events for international climate change actors. The 21st session of the Conferences of the 
Parties (COP21) was held between November 30 and December 12, 2015 and the outcomes of COP21 
are the most important since the enactment of the Kyoto protocol in 1997. 191 countries out of 197 have 
signed the agreement on April 22 and according the UNFCCC, 83 countries out of 197 have ratified the 
Paris agreement by October 5, 2016. This meets the criteria for the agreement to go into force on 
November 4, 2016. The international regime enforced the importance of COP21, as the environmental 
ministers of the G7 countries (Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America) met on May 15 and 16, 2016 for the first time since 2009, in the advent of 
the annual G7 summit on May 26 and 27, 2016, in Ise-Shima, Japan. These events have an effect on 
international and domestic political decision-making processes. However, criticism points towards the 
publicity effect due to heightened media attention. The measurable effect to formulate definitive 
political decisions would be negligible, as they lack actual influential power to change climate-related 
politics (Lück et al. 2016). Based on the last COP sessions since Kyoto in 1997, this argument is valid. 
Most recent developments require a reassessment of these findings. In general, events on international 
political cooperation do serve a publicity effect. Yet, they also serve as important means of raising 
public awareness and interest concerning environmental issues, function as a control mechanism for the 
international framework and international society, ensure environmental politics remain on the political 
agenda, and eventually may have a bearing on influencing environmental and energy policy decision-
making processes. Moreover, the development of new information and communication technologies 
(ICT), such as social media services like Facebook or Twitter, increases the range of actors involved in 
international negotiations to distribute information about their activities and opinions and has increased 
public awareness of environmental issues (Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui 2009).  
      The number of governmental organizations using social media has increased in the last few years 
(Freeman & Quirke 2013) and the main executive institutions of 26 out of 34 OECD countries operate 
a Twitter profile (Mickoleit 2014). This study contributes to the understanding of how governmental 
organizations facilitate new ICTs in the age of democratic transition. Using Twitter data of the German 
(@BMUB) and Japanese (@Kankyo_Jpn) environmental ministries profiles, the analysis examines 
how these two organizations use the microblogging service in the seven-month period between the start 
of COP21 on November 30, 2015 until July 3, 2016. Based on the agenda-setting function of 
governmental organizations, it is vital to analyze the impact and behavior of political organizations to 
understand how public discourses on the environment in democratic countries are being constructed 
and change over time.   
2 Source and access to the statement: http://www.bmub.bund.de/themen/europa-international/int-umweltpolitik/europa-
internationale-umweltpolitik-download/artikel/deutsch-japanische-klimaschutzerklaerung/ (last access: October 17, 2016). 
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1. Literature Review 
 
      Since the environmental movements in the 1960s and 1970s, climate change and environmental 
issues take an important part in daily news coverage (Hansen 2015). The function of mass media in 
influencing public opinion, shaping public discourses and increase public awareness of climate change 
is particularly salient in Japan (Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui 2009). There is a growing attention in research 
and academia to analyze the role of Twitter in context of social and political sciences that include 
politicians and political institutions (Cho & Park 2011, Jungherr 2014). Even though the number of 
political actors using social media has increased, they are latecomers in this online ground. Moreover, 
governmental organizations are slow in adapting to social changes (Freeman & Quirke 2013).  
Research about social media in politics has thus far focused on politicians and political campaigns. 
Politicians and individual profiles have a higher popularity in social media than institutions (Mickoleit 
2014) and the use of social media has both advantages and disadvantages. Even though politicians are 
actively engaged in online communication, their communicative behavior and responses show evidence 
that they are concerned about becoming victims of critical mistakes (Cho & Park 2011) and always try 
to save their face and not embarrass themselves (Otterbacher et al. 2013). The main objective of 
institutions is to disseminate information and not to facilitate interaction. Moreover, Otterbacher et al. 
(2013) conclude they actually try to avoid interaction. Their first goal is to protect themselves and their 
politics. To open the doors for more interaction and vertical communication poses risk to lose political 
power. Political institutions need to take online discussions for the policy making process into account 
(Hsu et al. 2013) and a skilled use of social media by political institutions could contribute to increase 
transparency and accountability of politicians and governmental organizations (Cho & Park 2013, 
Hemphill et al. 2013). The motives between individual or personal profiles and institution’s or 
organisation’s profiles differ and so do the means of social media communication strategies (Mickoleit 
2014). However, Mickoleit (2014) found that only few among OECD countries so far have an actual 
social media strategy. This shows not only uncertainty among the governments about the correct use of 
social media (Mickoleit 2014) but raises the question of personnel and resources.   
Governmental organizations in democratic countries rather use ICT primarily as an additional 
channel to distribute their information than engage in interactive communication (Freeman & Quirke 
2013, Hemphill et al. 2013, Mickoleit 2014). Providing information and position taking is most 
common, while requests for action are negligible (Hemphill et al. 2013). Issues on climate change are 
complex, which makes it difficult to harness social media for interactive engagement and involve 
citizens in the political decision-making processes.  
Studies about political institutions and their social media behavior are rare and fragmented, 
because social media and new ICT are fairly young and as such its use by political actors in an early 
phase of development (Hemphill et al. 2013, Jungherr 2014). With the increasing role of social media 
in political communication, it is necessary to re-examine how public discourses are being created. 
Social media can help to increase the awareness of particular messages. Examining online 
communication and discussions on issues concerning their society can provide better understanding of 
their reactions to these issues (Hsu et al. 2013).  
The effects of climate change on the environment have been scientifically proven and are in itself 
a major issue. How a society perceives and communicates these issues, in other words, the public’s 
understanding of climate change, and how social problems around climate change are being constructed, 
differ. The constructivist sociology explains how and why social problems come into existence and it 
recognizes the importance of the cultural context (cultural resonance perspective) in terms of 
construction of social problems (Hansen 2015). The government and its related institutions are still the 
main agenda-setter. Increasing the public understanding of the effects of climate change and the 
implementation of politics ensures political reliability. Institutions set norms and rules on which people 
can act. Effective measures against climate change are highly dependent on individual action taking in 
daily live. Political scientists are being criticized to have ignored the study of discourses (Habermas 
2008, Schmidt 2008) and the discursive institutionalism emphasizes the importance of ideas and 
discourses in the context of institutions and takes a more dynamic perspective of change into account 
than traditional institutionalists do (Schmidt 2008). According to Habermas, communication is essential 
for social integration and effective policy implementation. It is important to understand how institutions 
communicate with the public, how communication strategies change over time and why certain politics 
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are more effective than others. From the study of behavior the actual impact of public communication 
poses analytical problems. By applying analytical concepts on social media communication, user 
interaction and the available profile data, this paper proposes an approach to overcome this problem.  
2. Characteristics of Twitter
(1) Twitter demographics
Twitter is a microblogging social network service (SNS) on the World Wide Web with which people
can instantly share information, include links to other websites, within a short message called tweet of 
140 characters with the Twitter community called tweet. Tweets can be shared (called retweet) by other 
users. The retweet increases the impact-rate of the original tweet, because it makes the original tweet 
visible by the retweeter’s user network, called “snowball effect” (Mickoleit 2014). Additionally, being 
“mentioned” (recognizable with the “@” mark in front of a profile’s name in the tweet) in other users’ 
tweets increases popularity and attention (popularity bonus) (Mickoleit 2014). However, previous 
researches find that political leaders are more popular than institutions (Mickoleit 2014). The character 
of interaction in new ICTs is changing the nature of communication between politics and citizens (Kahn 
et al. 2013). Twitter is among the top ten social network services worldwide. In May 2016, Japan ranked 
four in the number of active Twitter users3. According to social media statistics, the daily use of Twitter 
in Japan in 2015 was higher than in Germany. The impact rate of Twitter in terms of governmental 
institutions profiles in Japan is higher than in Germany (section 4) and Twitter is the sixth most popular 
social network in Germany4. In both countries, the under 30 year-old dominate the social network 
population. 
(2) Political institutions on Twitter in Germany and Japan
All eleven ministries of the Japanese government have a Twitter account. In terms of the number of
Followers, @Kankyo_Jpn is ranked six. The ministry with the highest number of followers is the 
Ministry of Defence (@bouei_saigai) with 662.000 followers5. One cannot deny a correlation between 
the creation of profiles and the earthquake-tsunami-nuclear catastrophe in March 2011 on the east-cost 
of Japan: The Ministry of Defence created its profile in March 2011, the Ministry of Environment in 
April 2011 and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (@meti_NIPPON) also in March 2011. 
Only the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare (@MHLWitter) is on Twitter since before the 
catastrophe (since August 2010) and was the first of the eleven ministries to join the microblogging 
service. From the number of tweets, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MofaJapan_jp) has the highest 
number of tweets (18.900); more than double as @mextJapan (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology) that is on rank two in terms of number of tweets with 7,200. @Kankyo_Jpn 
however has compared to the other profiles the fewest number of Tweets; 1,331 by October 2016. This 
is not necessarily typical for the Twitter community in Japan. These numbers can provide insights, what 
topics the Twitter community in Japan is interested in: Security, Welfare, Education & Culture, Foreign 
Affairs, Infrastructure & Tourism, Environment, Economy & Industry, Internal Affairs, Finance, Justice 
and Forestry & Fisheries – in that order (based on the number of followers). Even though the 
@Kankyo_Jpn is in the average in terms of followers, the rather passive social media activity raises the 
question whether the ministry misses an opportunity (political opportunity structure) to increase their 
reach. Similar to Japan, the Federal Ministry for Defence (@bundeswehrinfo) and the Federal Foreign 
Office (@AuswaertigesAmt) dominate Twitter in terms of number of tweets among the 14 federal 
ministries. All of them facilitate a Twitter profile and some more than one. The Federal Foreign Office 
operates a profile in German (@AuswaertigesAmt) and in English (@GermanyDiplo). The number of 
tweets over time in relation to the time the profile is active is compared to the Japanese institutions not 
3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-in-selected-countries/ (last access: October 17, 
2016) 
4 https://www.statista.com/statistics/429496/frequency-of-social-media-usage-in-germany-by-social-media-site/ (last access: 
October 28, 2016) 
5 The numbers reflect the situation of October 2016. It is important to note that a situational description of social media data 
experiences changes in short time. But the general tendencies in this analysis is not expected to experience a drastic change 
in the general core.  
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much different. In terms of the number of followers, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (@BMUB) is on rank two, after the Federal Foreign Office. 
3. Method
(1) Variables
A mixed method approach has been used to analyze the twitter profiles quantitatively in terms of
their social interaction and network strategies (sociogram), and number of tweets (impact and behavior), 
qualitatively in terms of tweet content and hashtags. Hashtags categorize the tweet (Cho & Park 2012), 
which can be used to analyze the institution’s social media strategy. An approach to measure the impact 
of Twitter profiles has been performed following the quantitative behavioral analysis. The following 
two variables are the focus of this analysis to measure the environmental ministries’ social media 
behavior and impact by using Twitter data: Number of tweets in a time series analysis to measure the 
behavior and the number of followers to measure the impact.  
(2) Data collection
Twitter data for the Japanese Ministry of the Environment (@Kankyo_Jpn) and the German Federal
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (@BMUB) were 
downloaded through the NVivo tool for Windows Internet Explorer: NCapture. Through this tool tweets 
and profile information were archived as a dataset, including retweets and mentions. Table 1 
summarizes the size of the datasets as well as demographic information for both Twitter profiles. 
Compared to @BMUB, the fewer number of total tweets by @Kankyo_Jpn since the profile’s existence 
to the time this analysis was performed (1,331) allowed to archive (almost) all tweets of this profile 
(1,212). The number of tweets by @BMUB (8,388) since the profile is active is much higher. The size 
of the dataset is in relation between total number of tweets and available tweets for archiving fewer 
(2,986 of 8,388), but compared to @Kankyo_Jpn still higher.  
Table 1: Twitter profiles’ general information and dataset size for @BMUB and @Kankyo_Jpn. 
@BMUB @Kankyo_Jpn 
Profile online since July 2010 April 2011 
Total number of tweets by October 27, 2016 8,388 1,331 
Dataset size (number of available Tweets) 2,986 1,212 
Number of tweets in the seven- month period 1,853 212 
Date of oldest Tweet archived Aug. 8, 2015 May 27, 2013 
Number of followers by October 27, 2016 58,500 152,000 
Number following by October 27, 2016 459 43 
(3) Data preparation
Identifying main international events to define the time frame for analysis helps to understand how
governmental organizations are using social media. Prior to the G7 Summit on May 26 and 27 2016 in 
Ise-Shima, Japan, environment ministers from G7 countries and the European Union held a meeting on 
May 15 and 16 in Toyama, Japan. The datasets have been filtered first for the main time frame of a 
seven-month period between November 30 2015 and July 3 2016, as well as for each event as 
summarized in Table 2. The main dataset consists of tweet ID, username (recognized with the “@” 
sign), tweet, time, tweet type, retweeted by (name of Twitter profile that shared the original tweet), 
number of retweets, hashtags, mentions, name (different from username), location, web (link to a 
website, if included in the Tweet), bio (description of the profile that either created the Tweet, retweeted 
or mentioned a Tweet), number of tweets, number of followers, number following, and location 
coordinates. In terms of security and privacy policies, case sensitive information has been cleared from 
the dataset.  
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Table 2: Events used for pinpointing the Twitter dataset. 
Event Time Place 
COP21 November 30 to December 12, 2015 Paris, France 
Pre-COP (COP22) May 16 to 26, 2016 Bonn, Germany 
G7 Toyama, Environment 
Minister’s Meeting 
May 15 & 16, 2016 Toyama, Japan 
G7 Summit May 26 & 27, 2016 Ise-Shima, Japan 
4. Results
(1) Variable: Number of tweets in a time series (behavior)
To provide a better understanding of Germany’s and Japan’s environmental ministries’ social media
behavior, the Twitter profiles of all G7 countries’ environmental ministries are being compared in terms 
of number of tweets in a time series analysis for the aforementioned seven-month period. The difference 
between @BMUB and @Kankyo_Jpn represents two extremes. While @BMUB is rather active and 
makes strategic use of international events as the tweet-frequency increases during the defined time 
frames, @Kankyo_Jpn on the other hand has besides Italy the lowest tweet-frequency and shows no 
significant reaction at the time of the events. The content of Twitter is changing in a matter of minutes 
or sometimes seconds, depending on the topic and size of user network involved in tweeting. There is 
a risk a tweet can be overlooked, if the timing is ill chosen or a large community shares tweets at the 
same time.  
      In general, COP21 was an important event that effected social media behavior, while G7 and the 
environment ministers’ meeting had less effect. 15.7% of all tweets during the seven-month period by 
@BMUB was made during COP21 (1,853), and 13.2% (212 tweets in total during the seven-month 
period) in case of @Kankyo_Jpn. As for the pre-COP22 session between May 16, 2016 and May 26, 
2016, the number of tweets by @BMUB is 4.6%, and 8.0% for @Kankyo_Jpn in relation to the total 
number of tweets in the seven-month period. Even though, the G7 environmental ministers met for the 
first time since 2009, this meeting can be considered negligible in terms of its effect on the social media 
behavior. Because environmental issues are only one part of the G7 agenda, and even though G7 
Summits attract media attention, it is not an issue to be introduced to the Twitter community by the 
governmental organizations.  
Figure 1: Time series of G7 countries' environmental ministries’ Twitter profiles tweeting behavior. 
(2) Variable: Number of followers (impact)
This section proposes a methodology to measure the impact rate of political institutions on Twitter.
Mickoleit (2014) provided the general approach to analyze the number of followers in relation to the 
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general population. As discussed above, Twitter is more popular in Japan than in Germany, thus, the 
impact rate is higher through all eleven ministries compared to their German counterparts. The high 
impact rate of @BMUB (ranked two among all 14 ministries) reflects general findings of the importance 
of environmental issues in Germany as shown in Table 3. However, the measure of the impact rate 
based on the number of followers must be treated with caution as it represents only one side of the 
interaction. It is not possible to evaluate, whether users actually follow the ministries’ profiles. Sections 
4.3 and 4.4 aim to shed light on the interaction behind the follower-following relationship.  
Table 3: Twitter impact rate (%) of German and Japanese ministries. 
Japan Impact 
rate 
 Germany Impact 
rate 
Ministry of Defence (@bouei_saigai) 0.53  Federal Foreign Office 
(@AsuwaertigesAmt) 
0.56 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
(@MHLWitter) 
0.33  Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety 
(@BMUB) 
0.07 
Ministry for Education, Culture Sports, 
Science and Technology (@mextjapan) 
0.23  Federal Ministry for Family, Elderly, 
Women and Youth (@BMFSFJ) 
0.06 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(@MofaJapan_jp) 
0.17  Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (@BMWi_Bund) 
0.06 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism 
(@MLIT_JAPAN) 
0.13  Federal Ministry of Defence 
(@bundeswehrinfo) 
0.05 
Ministry of the Environment 
(@Kankyo_Jpn) 
0.12  Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(@BMZ_Bund) 
0.04 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(@meti_NIPPON) 
0.12  Federal Ministry of Finance 
(@BMF_Bund) 
0.03 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication (@MIC_JAPAN) 
0.10  Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection 
(@BMJV_Bund) 
0.02 
Ministry of Finance (@MOF_Japan) 0.10  Federal Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (@bmel) 
0.02 
Ministry of Justice (@MOJ_HOUMU) 0.09  Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (@BMBF_Bund) 
0.02 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (@MAFF_JAPAN) 
0.03  Federal Ministry of Health 
(@BMG_Bund) 
0.02 
   Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(@BMI_Bund) 
0.02 
 Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure (@BMVI) 
0.02 
 Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs (@BMAS_Bund) 
0.01 
*Impact rate=Number of followers in relation to the general population. Germany: 81,292,400 (Source: DeStatis); Japan: 125,891,742 (Source: 
Soumu). 
 
   (3) Analytical approach of communicative interaction (network strategy) 
      This section explores the graphical representation (sociogram) of the online communication 
interaction of the Japanese and German environmental ministries’ Twitter user profiles to find out to 
whom the governmental organizations maintain connections and what it can say about their social 
media behavior. Based on the findings in the previous section in terms of impact rate and popularity of 
Twitter in general, the network strategy analysis adds value to the previous analyses.  
      Figure 2 shows a highly interactive communication network by @BMUB with ties to mainly 
profiles of mass media companies and journalists. This supports the agenda-setting function of the 
ministry and the strong position within politics in Germany.  
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Figure 2: Twitter sociogram of @BMUB. 
 
      @Kankyo_Jpn revealed a quite different shape, compared to @BMUB, as shown in Figure 3. It is 
strikingly different in terms of the number of connections. A communicative interaction network is 
negligible. It maintains its strongest tie to the Twitter profile of the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare of Japan (@MHLWitter), but due to the few number of retweets and mentions it has no notable 
range in the Twitter community. Based on these findings, the MoE could be considered as weak and 
not influential in terms of shaping public opinion on the Internet.  
 
 
Figure 3 Twitter sociogram of @Kankyo_Jpn. 
 
   (4) Tweet content and hashtags: A qualitative approach 
      Hashtags describe keywords Twitter user assign when using the hashtag sign (#) in front of the term. 
With this method a Twitter user puts emphasis on a topic he/she wants to share with the Twitter 
community. Looking more qualitatively into the content of the Tweets by @BMUB showed and 
extensive use of hashtags compared to @Kankyo_Jpn, while @Kankyo_Jpn practically does not use 
hashtags at all. Even though @BMUB creates a comparatively great amount of hashtagged terms (143 
alone during COP21), because almost all of them are used only ones, these issues have a short life-span. 
63 
However, the available data does not contain information, whether a wider Twitter community is 
adapting these hashtags, which would support an agenda-setting function in social media by the ministry. 
      In terms of tweet content, the qualitative analysis may suggest slightly different conclusions than 
the quantitative analysis. @BMUB mainly focuses on informing about the environment minister’s 
activities and the ministries’ achievements in terms of projects and campaigns. After “COP21”, the 
name of the German environmental minister “Hendricks” is the most often used hashtag term. The 
hashtagged term “Klima” (climate) comes third. With the intense use of hashtags, the formulation of a 
complete (even short) sentence is very rare. Sometimes tweets by @BMUB would consist only of 
hashtags. This way of using social media suggests, that @BMUB is focusing its activities strongly 
around popular issues and (local) events, which produces the image of being actively engaged and 
promoting interaction. However, this behavior actually questions the sustainability of discussed issues 
and thus, may have less influential power to shape public opinion than initial results would suggest.  
      @Kankyo_Jpn on the other hand may present itself fairly passive in social media, but might be 
more sustainable. It tries to promote general behavioral shifts in the society by publishing tweets 
requesting specific activities directly, that increases the awareness of environmental issues and climate 
change politics at the same time, instead of focusing their messages on (local) short-lived events. For 
example, requests for saving water, energy and CO2 emissions by informing about released campaigns: 
“Think about global warming – Starting ‘CO2 reduction/Light down campaign’ Please cooperate”, “Be 
eco when do every day shopping”, “Not only NPOs, corporations or economic organisations, individual 
people can help create a system where society and environment have a good life together, too”6. 
Considering the number of followers (111,881) this may suggest that despite the quantitative findings 
discussed above, @Kankyo_Jpn could have more influential power in shaping public discourse through 
social media than first results would indicate.  
5. Conclusions 
      The findings suggest main differences in means and motivation of social media use by political 
institutions in Japan and Germany. The Twitter community in Japan is more fragmented and has no 
unified social media strategy of any. Based on the findings Germany seems to facilitate a more outlined 
social media strategy across institutions and is more interactive based on the number of followers and 
following, as well as likes, among the G7 countries. @BMUB’s ties are dominated by mass media and 
journalists, which supports the ministry’s agenda-setting function. But the character of the interaction 
suggests a rather closed network in terms of connections that might hinder individuals to be part in the 
exchange of thoughts, opinions and ideas. Additionally, an alleged high interaction rate does not 
necessarily prove to have more influence, as the passive receiver of a message must be taken into 
account as well as the content of the message. Yet, the effect on the passive receiver is analytically 
difficult to grasp, but based on communication and media studies, it is known that active engagement 
alone is not the main factor to shape public opinion (for example TV) (Otterbacher et al. 2013). The 
results suggest similarities between online and offline agenda setting role of environmental ministries 
in both countries. This confirms Hemphill et al.’s findings that public officials do not alter their 
communication strategies between media but rather use a common strategy across different media.  
      The existence of ICT and use of social media to promote vertical communication between politics 
and citizens does not automatically lead to new social systems, because the way communication and 
interaction happens in a society is being reflected on their online behavior. On the other hand, as 
@Kankyo_Jpn’s Twitter activity is far more passive when comparing the total number of Tweets as 
well as their network strategies (sociograms) including retweets and mentions with @BMUB, the total 
number of @Kankyo_Jpn’s followers can be interpreted as a potential to raise the ministry’s public 
attention on their agenda. In terms of post-COP21 environmental politics, the content of the Tweets 
show no significant change. However, @BMUB is highly influenced by international and domestic 
events related to environmental issues and climate change politics in terms of their tweeting activities. 
The number of followers and following is increasing frequently. This analysis is in that regard limited 
as it is only capable of explaining a snap-shot and the question remains whether governmental 
organizations should use social media and increase their “popularity bonus”. Considering the relation 
6 Translation from Japanese into English by the author. 
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between @BMUB and mass media on Twitter, its engagement in online public discourses and in case 
of @Kankyo_Jpn to actively request change of behavior, it is important to reconsider the role of political 
institutions and governmental organizations in the current phase of democratic transition.  
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Introduction 
      The climate change issue is one of the major problems facing the international society. The deepening 
of globalization has led to various issues beyond individual national states that have been in the territory of 
individual national states, such as security, economy, human rights, and environment, etc. and global 
governance is highly required in the international society. The international society is responding as one of 
the most important international issues to the climate change issues which both cause and effect are global 
as one of the most important international issues. Based on the awareness of the climate change issue, starting 
with the publication of the reports of the Club of Rome which title is "The Limits to Growth" in 1972, the 
international society has begun to build a global environmental regime as a diverse form of international 
cooperation system to solve the environmental issue. 
      These efforts from the international society, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio in June 1992, have led to the adoption of United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is the most influential international regime on the current 
climate change issue. 
      At the First Conference of the Parties (COP 1) of UNFCC held in Berlin in 1995, countries agreed 
existing UNFCCC would not be able to meet to achieve the long-term goal of reducing global greenhouse 
gas emissions, and that with the goal of limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions within a certain 
period. The states party to UNFCCC, at the Third Conference of the Parties (COP 3) held in Kyoto in 1997, 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol which 37 Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members 
of the OECD, countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic countries 
and several European countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 2008 to 2012 by 5.2% compared to 
1990. And for making the Kyoto Protocol possible, the Kyoto Mechanisms, which are Clean development 
mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), Emissions trading (ET), was created as a flexible mechanism. 
Since then, the Kyoto Protocol in UNFCCC has served as a basic framework until the 2020 Paris Agreement 
with many twists and turns like Adoption of the Marrakesh Accords to discuss of legal binding for 
noncompliance at the COP11 held in Montreal in 2001, Refusal to ratify of the United States in 2001 and 
withdrawal of Canada. 
      To end of Kyoto Protocol by 2020, the participants of UNFCCC have been pursuing the establishment 
of a new climate change treaty that will complement the Kyoto Protocol. By agreeing to the opposition and 
raising issue of the Parties to the principle of 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities(CBDR)' that is 
the great feature of the Kyoto Protocol, and the of greenhouse gas emissions from countries that they are not 
in Annex 1 Parties group, at COP17 in 2011, a new consensus was reached, and the post-Kyoto system was 
announced. At COP18 held in Doha in 2012, it was agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol by 2020 and to 
1 This paper is based on a presentation entitled “Social network analysis of the influence of participation in the 
international environmental regime: The Twitter network of participating NGOs in Germany, Japan and 
Republic of Korea in COP21,“ presented at DISC 2016/4th WATEF International Conference (World 
Association for Triple Helix & Future Strategy Studies), December 8, 2016. 
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finalize the new climate regime by 2015 and at the COP19 held in Warsaw in 2013, the "Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions(INDCs)" that is the great feature of the Paris Agreement and approach that 
everyone does what they like, has determined. At the COP21 in Paris, with the successful adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, which was agreed by 195 of the 197 state parties, the Paris agreement launches the next 
era from 2020 after the Kyoto protocol. 
 
1. Theoretical background and Review 
 
   (1) Global regime and global governance 
      The most widely used definition of the global regime is the definition of Krasner. He defines the regime, 
"Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in each area of international relations" (Krasner, 1982). He also explains four 
elements of the regime. The first is principles of facts, causality, and beliefs about rightness; the second is 
norms such as the standards of behavior defined as rights and obligations. The third is rules that include 
specific instructions and prohibitions, and the last is decision-making procedures. 
      According to Young, Governance systems solve conflicts and facilitate cooperation, and more generally, 
it is important to establish and operate an international system in which the global society that is made up of 
interdependent actors and they can resolve the problem by collective action. And the global regime is 
designed to cope with the particular issues and fields of this global governance system. Also, according to 
Stokke, in the researchers on regimes tend to be more nationalistic and focus on rules in the international 
society centered on nation-states, while in global governance researchers focus on the diversity of actors 
who form and conduct rules and orders along with the phenomenon of the regime. 
 
   (2) Expansion of the NGO role in global governance 
      In global governance, NGOs have an important position. And, they are expanding their role by 
complementing the limits of national-centered governance by finding their own needs and superiority in new 
environments in the global society, such as the provision of expertise, the creation of public opinion, 
mobilization of protests and education. Participation and cooperation of NGOs as the actors of civil society, 
along with the non-national actors who are international organizations and transnational corporations are 
key actors of global governance. 
      The fact that NGOs play a key role in global governance is closely related to the emergence of 
international society as an actor of NGOs through globalization. With the advent of the internet, which has 
The free flow of information and a significantly lower physical limit compared to the past, as a means of 
communication due to the development of science and communication technology, the scope of activities of 
NGOs limited to individual countries has expanded to the global level, and they have begun to raise voice 
various issues on a global scale. (Mathews, 1997). 
      NGOs that have started to grow explosively since the 1980s have begun to expand their influence in the 
international society through criticism and surveillance as a new actor outside the existing nation-states who 
played the role of the main actor in the international society. The activities of NGOs began to become 
energetic at first in areas with strong global and transnational characteristics such as peace, environment and 
human rights. 
      The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCAGE) in 1972, which is the early 
global governance mechanism in the field of environment, approximately 300 NGOs began participating as 
observers, and approximately 1,400 organizations participated in the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, 
which played an important role in the development of international environmental regimes. Also, at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, 3,000 accredited NGOs were approved for 
participation (Clark et al., 1998). NGOs have also played a role, albeit partially, in the military issue, which 
is the exclusive territory of the nation-states. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is a prime 
example. About 350 NGOs around the world cooperated, and they informed and campaigned about the 
seriousness of the damage caused by and the inhumanity of anti-personnel landmines. They finally 
succeeded in getting the treaty backed by 89 nations in the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International 
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines held in Oslo in September 1997 (Price, 1998). 
      The role of NGOs in terms of global governance has taken a rapid pace since the Commission on Global 
Governance published the report “Our Global Neighborhood” in 1995, and in 1998, the United Nations 
formally recognized the participation and role started to set up a practical system of NGOs in global 
governance through the report of the UN Secretary-General entitled “Arrangements and practices for the 
United Nations system of non-governmental organizations”. It can be seen as the beginning of the UN’s 
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crucial policy shift towards the status of NGOs, which began to make a position itself by the core of global 
governance. 
      The expansion of the influence of NGOs is due to the important characteristics that NGOs have. Clark 
et al. point out two comparative advantages that NGOs have over governments. First, NGOs are more 
effective because they can focus on a single issue, compared to governments that must perform complex 
functions. Second, in the issue based on principles and values, the government tends to subordinate or ignore 
under other policies depending on the priority of policy, while NGOs can act immediately. However, even 
though this comparative advantage of NGOs could be an advantage for NGOs during participating in global 
governance, but it does not necessarily guarantee participation. Nowadays, the participation of NGOs as an 
actor in the global governance is still allowed by the nation-state who they have the voting right. The main 
reason why countries are obliged to engage NGOs in the field of global governance is that the huge influence 
of NGOs. It means, it is very important that NGOs play an important role in securing the legitimacy of global 
governance. 
      NGOs can influence the legitimacy of the international community through mobilization of public 
support, the formation of public opinion, practical experience and expertise from field activities (Price, 1998). 
In addition, although participation of NGOs to the global governance is limited to consultative status in only 
areas where it is possible for nation state can make concessions and not allowed to participate in the official 
decision-making process, NGOs seek to gain their influence into the decision-making process through 
informal and various ways, and these activities of NGOs lead to greater influence of NGOs in the role of 
global governance drastically. 
 
   (3) NGOs and networks 
      The most distinctive characteristics of NGOs in comparison to nation-states or transnational corporations 
is the establishment of networks with the horizontal relationship for cooperation and collaboration. 
According to Guo and Acar "Nonprofit collaboration as what occurs when different nonprofit organizations 
work together to address problems through joint effort resources, and decision making and share ownership 
of the final product or service" (Guo & Acar 2005). In this social network, the relationship of actors and the 
flow of resources is interdependent, and the analytic unit is not individuals, but the connections by 
individuals and their associations. 
In the international society, the network of NGOs has grown remarkably. NGOs have emerged as actors of 
global governance and have been influencing the agenda setting and policy formation process in the 
international society with collaboration and cooperation variously. As mentioned above, the development of 
traffic and information communication technology has made travel and information exchange a convenient 
for networking. 
      The network of NGOs provides usefulness to NGOs in a variety of ways. The network of NGOs can help 
other NGOs as a useful solution in a situation to be hampered by domestic or local activities against their 
governments or infringers. That is, local and domestic NGOs use global networks to appeal their claims to 
international society and their right to be infringed, by which they can exert a stronger influence on their 
governments and infringers through the pressure of global network. Also, the global network of NGOs gets 
the opportunity to develop through communication with other various organizations such as participating in 
international conferences, protests, and online communications. Through these exchanges, large NGOs 
provide small NGOs with access to varied resources, educational opportunities, and information, and small 
NGOs identify large NGOs with the increase of the actors and connections of the networks and the colleagues 
who are operating together (Keck & Sikkink 1998). 
      The global network of NGOs has become an important mechanism for establishing international 
solidarity beyond nation-states and region and spreading the values, tactics, and behavior of people in various 
countries and peoples in the network age. By the global NGO network, particularly, it is possible to develop 
reliable countermeasures and to conduct public opinion and the information on issues that individual NGOs 
are hard to handle. In other words, participation in the global NGO network encourages the social movements 
at the local level where small organizations are main actors and promote networks to enable local and 
national issues to develop into the global frame.  
 
2. Research Purpose and Method  
 
   (1) Purpose 
      Various researchers are focused on the impact of NGO participation on global governance and the global 
regime, but there are not many types of research on the impact of global governance and the global regime 
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on the networks of NGOs. Thus, this paper compares the quality of network with the participation in the 
global regime by analyzing online networks of NGOs in Germany, Japan, and South Korea who participated 
to COP21, and analyzes how the network is changing before and after participating in the global regime. At 
last, this paper evaluates the network of NGOs in three countries. 
 
   (2) Methods and Data 
 
 
Figure 1. The Number of Admitted NGOs by Nationality 
 
      For Assessing the network of NGOs that are part of the global regime, at first, making the list of 1866 
admitted NGOs by the UNFCCC for the COP21, and except for the United States because of too many 
organizations comparatively and countries which have 10 or fewer. Finally, 125 organizations of Germany, 
55 organizations of Japan and 17 organizations of South Korea are selected. 
      For the social network analysis of online level, this paper uses following/follower data of Twitter as one 
of the representative social media. For data collection and analysis, Python is used for data collection and 
organizing, and Gephi and Ucinet are used for the analysis and the visualization. 
 
3. Results: Follow Network 
 
 combined Germany Japan South Korea 
nodes 96(79) 71(63) 16(7) 9(7) 
edges 514 481 10 18 
average degree 5.354 6.775 0.625 2 
density 0.056 0.097 0.042 0.25 
centralization 
degree 0.243 0.312 0.181 0.482 
betweenness 0.1187 0.177 0.067 0.267 
reciprocity 
Arc 0.533 0.536 0.6 0.556 
Dyad 0.363 0.366 0.429 0.385 
Table 1. The measure of the networks of NGOs 
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   (1) The combined network of three countries 
 
Figure 2. Combined networks of the NGOs in three countries (In-degree) 
 
 
degree closeness between- 
ness out in out in 
G11 0.295 G11 0.253 G11 0.237 G11 0.232 G11 0.126 
G32 0.284 G13 0.211 G32 0.236 G28 0.228 G13 0.05 
G46 0.211 G10 0.2 G48 0.231 G13 0.227 G33 0.043 
G45 0.189 G28 0.2 G45 0.228 G37 0.227 J07 0.042 
G21 0.168 G64 0.147 G46 0.227 G65 0.223 G10 0.038 
Table 2. Centrality top 5 actors (Combined networks of the NGOs in three countries) 
 
      This chapter figures out the entire network by combining NGOs of Germany, Japan, and South Korea 
into one network.  
      Firstly, from the aspect of the whole network, there are 96 nodes in this network, and 79 nodes have a 
connection with at least one association. The network consists of two cliques without the 17 isolated nodes. 
One clique includes most of the connected nodes which are organizations in Germany and Japan, and the 
clique with German and Japanese nodes is mainly composed of three clusters that two clusters consist of the 
German NGOs mostly and the other is a Japanese one. The other clique is composed of nodes which are 
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South Korean NGOs. One organization connects with about five nodes on average, more than half of the 
connected nodes are interconnected. Also, more than 36% of all the connections are mutual. 
      An interesting part of this network from the perspective of individual nodes is that three of Japanese 
NGOs are connected to the network of the German NGOs. The identity of three nodes is J072 "Institute for 
Sustainable Energy Policies", J11 "Keio University" and J13 "Mie University". Among the three nodes, J07 
is "structural hole (Burt, 2004)" who can have complementary sources to information that play a role as a 
broker between Japanese cluster and German cluster. In this network, J07 is ENGO3 cooperated with CAN 
which is a global network of environmental NGOs, it connects to G37, ENGO whose name is "International 
Solar Energy Society e.V.", and G66, BINGO named "World Wind Energy Association". Other two 
organizations are not connected with the network of Japanese NGOs, but they connect only with the German 
NGOs. Also, German NGOs which relate to these two Japanese RINGOs are also RINGOs.  
      The network of NGOs in Korea is independent. They only have a relationship with each other in the 
Twitter network, but not with organizations of Germany and Japan. 
 
   (2) The network in Germany 
 
degree closeness between- 
ness out in out in 
G11 0.400 G11 0.343 G11 0.452 G11 0.395 G11 0.188 
G32 0.386 G13 0.286 G32 0.449 G28 0.380 G13 0.069 
G46 0.286 G10 0.271 G48 0.417 G13 0.376 G10 0.062 
G45 0.257 G28 0.271 G23 0.407 G10 0.361 G28 0.056 
G21 0.229 G64 0.200 G45 0.407 G34 0.359 G32 0.052 
Table 3. Centrality top 5 actors (Germany) 
 
      The size of NGOs in Germany is not only the largest of the three countries but also the third largest in 
the world among the countries which participated in COP21. Also, in contrast with Japan and Korea, 
German NGOs also show a comparatively high rate of utilizing social media (71 out of 125 organizations). 
As well, NGOs which use social media are also making efforts to build networks in social media. 
      As described earlier, the network of NGOs in Germany consists of two loose clusters and only eight 
isolated nodes. It is the fact that some nodes like G11, G32, and G46 have a great influence on this network, 
but most of the nodes are connected diversely.  
      The node G11, which is a key player in this network, named "Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH)" is participating in the 
UNFCCC as ENGO. Its activities, however, are not limited to climate change issues, but a variety of areas 
with a philosophy of pursuit of public benefit. GIZ(G11) is a specialized intermediary organization that 
conducts consulting and management intermediate the governments, the corporations and the civil society. 
On the network, G11 is consulting with 28 nodes mainly research groups. Other organizations that have high 
degree-centrality are mainly focused on environmental issues as well in the UNFCCC, but also, they are 
organizations that operate through cooperation with the governments, the corporations, and the civil society. 
 
                                                     
2 The information of nodes is shown in the Appendix. 
3 The nine constituencies, which UNFCCC process admitted, are: Business and industry NGOs (BINGO), 
Environmental NGOs (ENGO), Farmers, Indigenous people’s organizations (IPO), Local government and 
municipal authorities (LGMA), Research and independent NGOs (RINGO), Trade union NGOs (TUNGO), 
Women and Gender Constituency (WGC), and Youth NGOs (YOUNGO). The number of organizations in the 
three contingencies that are ENGO, RINGO and BINGO./ Statistics on observer organizations in the 
UNFCCC process (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/observer_organizations/items/9545txt.php 
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Figure 3. Networks of the NGOs in Germany (In-degree) 
 
   (3) The network in Japan 
      The big features of the NGO network in Japan are that the ratio of isolated nodes is very high, and the 
structure of the network is the shape of "star (Bogartti & Everett, 2000)" by unipolar tendency with node J12 
"Kiko Network" (ENGO) which affiliates with CAN. 
      Also, the percentage of NGOs using social media is very low compared to the number of organizations 
participating in COP21, as well as, even if an NGO uses social media, the number of organizations that build 
networks is very small. That has something in common with Foljanty-Jost's point that weaknesses in 
Japanese civil society, such as lack of resources, closure and lack of solidarity (Foljanty-Jost, 2005). Also, 
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the number of NGOs participated in COP21 is about more than three times of the number of organizations 
in Korea, but the online network is similar to or smaller than South Korea. 
 
Figure 4. Networks of the NGOs in Japan (In-degree) 
 
degree closeness between- 
ness out in out in 
J12 0.200 J12 0.400 J12 0.385 J12 0.455 J12 0.067 
J07 0.133 J02 0.133 J07 0.375 J02 0.405     
J02 0.067 J07 0.067 J04 0.375 J07 0.395     
J04 0.067 J09 0.067 J06 0.375 J09 0.395     
J06 0.067     J14 0.375 J04 0.333     
Table 4. Centrality top 5 actors (Japan) 
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   (4) The network in South Korea 
      First, one of the important features of the network on NGOs in South Korea is small size and lacks 
diversity. The comprehensive contingency of the NGOs in Korea is ENGO, while there are NGOs in the 
German network have eight contingencies and three in Japan. This is reflected in the fact that the 
contingencies of the organizations participating in COP21 did not vary widely. 
      Nevertheless, in consideration of the small number of organizations participating COP21, the online 
network is comparatively not bad. Regarding the average number of connections and high ranked nodes in 
the out-degree measure, every single node has two connections and not too centralized even though K06 is 
a powerful actor in the network. It is behind the network of German NGOs, but regarding the diversity of 
information, flow is insignificantly better than Japan which has three more participants in COP21 than South 
Korea. 
      However, the networks in Japan and Germany have inter-network connections each other, contrarily, 
Korean network has no connection with foreign organizations. The isolated clique is a weak point to the 
network in Korea. 
 
 
Figure 5. Networks of the NGOs in Korea (In-degree) 
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degree closeness between- 
ness out in out in 
K05 0.625 K06 0.75 K05 0.533 K06 0.571 K06 0.277 
K06 0.5 K07 0.375 K06 0.444 K07 0.471 K07 0.08 
K07 0.5 K03 0.375 K07 0.444 K03 0.471 
  
K03 0.25 K04 0.375 K03 0.4 K04 0.471 
  
K02 0.125 K02 0.25 K02 0.381 K08 0.421 
  
Table 5. Centrality top 5 actors (South Korea) 
 
4. Findings and limitations 
 
   (1) Findings 
      In this study, comparative analysis is conducted to identify the online network structure of NGOs 
Germany, Japan, and South Korea who participated in COP21 using social network analysis contrary to 
previous researchers that focused on case studies or regime itself.  
      As a result, some findings can be summarized as follows. In the network of NGOs in Germany of the 
online level, networking is much more active than Japan and South Korea. It is not from a large number of 
nodes due to the large number of organizations who participated in COP21, but the connections among the 
organizations in the network are more tight and closer than the networks of Japan and South Korea. It shows 
that the online network of German NGOs is stronger than Japan or South Korea. What is interesting is that 
between the networks of Germany and the network of Japanese, the two networks are interconnected by 
connection of few organizations. These organizations are acting as a “weak tie (Granovetter, 1973)” and a 
“structure hole. (Burt, 2004)” In Japan, on the other hand, only a very small number of organizations were 
connected to the online network. The number of NGOs which participated to COP21 is not small. It is about 
more than three times of the number of organizations in Korea, but the online network is similar or smaller 
than South Korea. The biggest difference between the two networks in Japan and South Korea is the structure 
of network involved power. Accordance with the results, the network in Japan more centralized the power. 
In contrast, the structure of the network in South Korea is dispersed and less centralized to one node.  
 
   (2) Limitations 
      To facilitate comparison between the target networks, the size of each network is made different. That 
makes the comparison analysis between the networks obviously clear, meanwhile the setting the difference 
of each network size makes slightly difficult to compare Japan and South Korea with Germany, because the 
network size of Japan and South Korea is relatively too smaller than Germany. In addition, by analyzing the 
Twitter network, it was possible to analyze the online network which is low barrier to entry. However, Time-
specific data is not provided from the Twitter API, so follow network could not be analyzed by time.  
      To more accurately verify the inter-influence between participating the international environmental 
regimes and their own networks, Next researches will need to include the full network of NGOs in COP as 
well as networks with non-NGOs. At last, a more rigorous research design is needed to assess the influence 
of regimes and networks each other. 
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Identifying the “Fukushima Effect”: 
Assessing Japanese Mass Media Coverage of International Nuclear Power Decisions1 
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In the aftermath of the nuclear crisis involving the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant on March 
11, 2011, nuclear power generation in Japan and other countries has come under close public scrutiny. 
Immediately following the nuclear crisis, countries such as Switzerland and Germany that have relied 
historically on nuclear power utilization started to seriously reconsider safety measures surrounding 
nuclear power generation. Such considerations led to the June 2011 decision in the German Bundestag 
that went into force on August 6, 2011. 
In the process of determining its own domestic nuclear energy policy, assessments and evaluations 
of other countries’ responses in the aftermath of “3.11” have appeared frequently in Japan’s domestic 
mass media. Yet have the nuclear energy policies in certain other countries such as Germany been singled 
out for comparison with Japan’s own energy strategies and priorities? Furthermore, has such coverage 
tended to focus on the positive or negative aspects of nuclear energy? 
In this paper, we assess the characteristics of Japanese mass media coverage of public opinion 
concerning nuclear energy policy in other countries. From a methodological perspective, our research 
draws on a combination of content analysis and sentiment analysis and investigates how the German case 
appeared in news articles concerning nuclear power in Japan in the six-month period from March 11 to 
September 11, 2011, identifies the main policy actors involved, and assesses if the coverage was positive 
or negative. 
 
Keywords: Nuclear Energy Policy, Content Analysis, International Policy Comparisons, Japanese Journalism, Grounded 
Theory, Framing Theory, Narrative Theory 
 
              ─────────────────── 
 
Introduction 
      In the aftermath of the nuclear crisis involving the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant on March 
11, 2011, nuclear power generation in Japan and other countries has come under close public scrutiny. 
Immediately following the nuclear crisis, countries such as Switzerland and Germany that have relied 
historically on nuclear power utilization started to seriously reconsider safety measures surrounding nuclear 
power generation. Such considerations led to the June 2011 decision in the German Bundestag that went into 
force on August 6, 2011. Germany is internationally known to be at the forefront in tackling environment 
and energy policy issues on a national scale under wide political and social consensus. 
      Germany’s coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party (Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen) between 1998 and 2005 already pursued nuclear phase-out and formulated its legislative 
framework into their political agenda. Only a few months before the Great East Japan Earthquake, which 
damaged the nuclear reactor of the Fukushima Dai’ichi power plant run by the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) and caused the most serious nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the 
                                                     
1  This paper was originally published as a Research Note in the Journal of International and Advanced 
Japanese Studies, 8, 109-124, February 2016. 
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new government coalition formed after the 2009 general elections of the Christian/Social-Democratic Union 
Party (CDU/CSU) and Free- Liberal Party (FDP) postponed nuclear phase-out under major pressure from 
nuclear-energy-generating electricity companies in Germany. But the crisis involving the nuclear power 
plant on March 11, 2011 immediately spurred the reintroduction of a nuclear phase-out platform which was 
eventually labeled as the “phase-out of the phase-out” (Schreurs, 2012). 
      In the process of determining its own domestic nuclear energy policy, assessments and evaluations of 
other countries’ responses in the aftermath of “3.11”2 have appeared frequently in Japan’s domestic mass 
media. Yet have the nuclear energy policies in other countries been singled out for comparison with Japan’s 
own energy strategies and priorities? Furthermore, has such coverage tended to focus on the positive or 
negative aspects of nuclear energy? Arlt and Wolling (2015: 3) have identified the “Fukushima Effect,” 
using this phrase to describe “international findings on attitude changes towards nuclear power as a result of 
the Fukushima accident.” However, their results show only a moderate impact of this incident in terms of 
attitudes towards nuclear energy based on an analysis of German mass media coverage and survey data. In 
consideration of Germany’s reaction on a wide political scale, we assess the characteristics of Japanese mass 
media coverage of public opinion concerning nuclear energy policy in Germany. We are specifically 
interested in assessing how Germany’s sudden energy shift as a reaction to the Fukushima incident was 
perceived through four major Japanese newspapers (the Asahi, the Mainichi, the Nikkei, and the Yomiuri). 
From a methodological perspective, our research draws on a combination of content analysis and sentiment 
analysis, and investigates the discourse involving Germany, drawing on news articles concerning nuclear 
power in Japan in the six-month period from March 11 to September 11, 2011, identifies the main policy 
actors involved, and assesses if the coverage was positive or negative. 
      The first section provides an overview of Japan’s legal framework regarding nuclear energy policy and 
the historical background of nuclear energy in Japan, followed by a review of the literature covering the 
aspects of nuclear energy determinants in Japan and characteristics of the Fukushima news coverage. Then, 
we discuss briefly the theoretical framework and methodology that we draw on to explain our results. As 
our research involves qualitative content analysis, framing theory, with its focus on analyzing in-depth issues 
or events, serves our aim to combine content analysis and sentiment analysis of text data. We combine this 
theoretical approach with constructivist grounded theory to reveal crucial issues in the research questions by 
coding the data interactively instead of using predetermined parameters. We suggest that this combination 
of framing as a traditional approach and grounded theory with a new approach in computer-assisted text 
analysis can allow us to uncover new patterns in investigating news coverage and provides a potential 
solution to the critical role the researcher takes within his/her own research in grounded theory. In section 
five, we discuss our main results, wherein we examine the articles in each newspaper individually, and close 
with a brief comparison of the characteristics in the news coverage of the German case in the four newspapers, 
where we summarize our main findings and evaluate our methodology for further research. 
 
1. Nuclear energy discourses in Germany and Japan 
 
      Since the 1960s, anti-nuclear energy issues have been part of the political agenda in Germany. The 
establishment of the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in 1980 and its election to the German Bundestag 
in 1983 defined the path for strong environmental/anti-nuclear energy policy discourse. Different than in 
Japan where the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is in charge of nuclear-energy regulations, 
Germany’s nuclear-energy policy is regulated by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), established in 1986 (Schreurs 2002). The red-green coalition 
between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Union 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) under 
former chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) between 1998 and 2005 set the foundation for nuclear phase-out. 
With the 13th change of the Atomic Act (January 1, 1960) on July 31, 2011, as a direct response to the 
Fukushima accident, the governmental coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP returned to a policy of 
phasing out nuclear energy by 2022. Even though the effect on domestic energy policy decisions after 
Fukushima eventually led to consensus between the ruling and the opposition parties, the Chernobyl 
catastrophe in 1986 in the Ukraine, a close neighbor, had a lasting influence on Germany’s anti-nuclear 
policy path. This background of political attention to nuclear issues made the characteristic reaction on the 
                                                     
2 The phrase “3.11” (pronounced “three-eleven”) is frequently used by the Japanese people to refer to the triple 
disasters that occurred on March 11, 2011 involving the Great East Japan Earthquake, the resulting tsunami, and 
the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear power plant. 
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Fukushima disaster on public and policy discourses in Germany possible (Seiffert & Fähnrich 2014). 
      The origins of Japan’s anti-nuclear movement dates back to the 1950s. The first incident involved the 
Lucky Dragon No. 5 (Daigo fukuryu ̄ maru), wherein a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to and 
contaminated by nuclear fallout from the U.S. Army’s hydrogen bomb testing in March 1954. This incident 
was the initial catalyst for future anti-nuclear movements in Japan. During the 1970s and 1980s, other 
incidents occurred such as the Mutsu radiation leak accident in 1974, which drew limited attention to the 
nuclear power debate. From the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, as a result of political and social factors, 
administrative reforms related to nuclear energy were carried out, and the building of new nuclear power 
plants was not permitted during this period (Honda, 2005). 
      However, anti-nuclear social movements faced a difficult situation after the 1980s. Labor unions that 
had supported these movements were shrinking as a result of reorganization of the labor market. The Cold 
War ended and the prestige of Marxism was gradually decreasing. As a result of these global and political 
changes, social movements gradually lost material resources and ideological status. In the summer of 1994, 
the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP) changed its nuclear energy strategy and accepted the use of 
nuclear power plants in order to join the coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 
(LDP) and the New Party Sakigake. At the same time, information regarding many nuclear accidents and 
scandals surfaced, and social movements were activated especially at the local level. Isolated nuclear 
incidents continued to occur, for example, the Tokaimura nuclear accident at a JCO3 plant in September 
1999, which was estimated to have reached “level four” on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) 
(Kawana, 2013: 276). In response, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness was enacted in the same year. 
      After the Fukushima accident in March 2011, Japan’s nuclear energy policies entered a complicated 
phase, however it seems that the disaster did not engender fundamental policy changes. In September 2012, 
Noda Yoshihiko, a DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) politician and the former prime minister from 
September 2011 to December 2012, devised new energy and environmental strategies that included halting 
the operation of all nuclear power plants by the 2030s. Also, new regulatory standards were formulated in 
2013, and nuclear safety regulations were strengthened substantially (Yamaguchi, 2013: 1, 8-9). However, 
Noda decided to restart the nuclear power plants which were sitting idly after the Fukushima Disaster in 
order to meet energy demand, and the Oi nuclear power plant located in Fukui prefecture was restarted in 
July 2012. Also, the Sendai nuclear power plant located in Kagoshima prefecture was restarted in August 
2015, based on a decision made by prime minister Abe Shinzo. 
      Japan and Germany have been part of international environmental and anti-nuclear movements since the 
early post-war era and political responses towards environmental issues have prominently figured in news 
coverage. Even though Japan experienced nuclear accidents prior to Fukushima, even afterwards, anti-
nuclear movements have struggled to encourage public discourse which could influence political decisions. 
Yet strong ties between the LDP-led government and economic ministries with industry contacts have 
dominated the discourse (Hartwig et al. 2014). In contrast, the energy industry in Germany has been active 
in promoting renewable/clean energies and favors nuclear phase-out, which, in turn, has been reflected in 
environmental/anti- nuclear public opinion in the mass media. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
   (1) Determinants of Japan’s nuclear policies 
      There are numerous studies that focus on both domestic and international factors that determine nuclear 
policy in Japan. First, we focus on studies that point to domestic factors. Honda Hiroshi (2005, 2014) 
analyzed the political process of Japan’s nuclear energy policy from the perspective of social movement 
theory. More specifically, he focused on not only the dominant political actors such as the bureaucracy, the 
ruling party and industrial associations, but also opposition parties, civic movements, labor unions and local 
governments that potentially have opportunities to change nuclear policy. The major results from his studies 
have been that (a) opposition parties and labor unions that have supported movements were split in half and 
this led to weakening the anti-nuclear movements by the 1980s; (b) pro-nuclear political actors that were 
supported by economic groups seized power after 1990s; and (c) many nuclear accidents garnered publicity 
                                                     
3 Formerly the Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co., which is now defunct. Source: World Nuclear Association 
(2013) Tokaimura Criticality Accident 1999 (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of- 
Plants/Tokaimura-Criticality-Accident/) (Access date: September 20, 2015). 
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and social movements were activated especially at the local level (Honda, 2005). The Fukushima Dai’ichi 
incident promoted reactivation of pro-nuclear groups as well as anti-nuclear groups (Honda, 2014). The 
restart of the Oi and Sendai nuclear power plants suggests that Japan’s nuclear policies have been determined 
by the attitudes of political elites4. 
      On the other hand, there is also the question as to whether international factors, for example, the 
international system or international policy changes, have played a role in determining Japan’s nuclear 
policies. Shibata and Tomokiyo (1999) argued that Japan’s public opinion has tended to be more cautious 
about nuclear energy after major nuclear accidents such as the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster5. Sagara (2009) suggested that international policy changes and discussions have some 
impact on Japan’s political decision-making regarding nuclear energy. Suzuki (2014) focused on import and 
export policies of nuclear technology and analyzed historical changes in the international system that 
promote the use of nuclear energy. As a result of her analysis, she claimed that there has been a major impact 
in decision-making processes by the U.S. government and its nuclear power industries, but the impact of the 
Soviet Union under the Cold War and China in the 21st century cannot be ignored as well. After the 
Fukushima Dai’ichi incident, there have been numerous publications that focus on nuclear and energy policy 
or energy security strategies in various countries from both pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear groups (Kawaguchi-
Mahn, 2013; Kawaguchi, 2015). International factors are frequently specified through international 
organizations, treaties or international accidents, and may have had some impact on Japan’s decision-making 
regarding nuclear policy. 
 
   (2) Characteristics of news coverage of 3.11 in Japan and Germany 
      Numerous studies about media, communication and journalism have pointed to the vital role that the 
mass media plays in shaping political discourse and public opinion in modern democratic countries such as 
Germany and Japan. Whereas the media landscape in Japan is considered to have a characteristically high 
influence on determining public opinion and political discourse (Takeshita & Takeuchi 1996), studies 
analyzing characteristics of Japanese and German mass media in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident 
provide a solid basis for our research. To address the question whether the effect of Fukushima on 
international energy and nuclear policy shows evidence of pressure through a reverse effect in changing its 
own domestic nuclear energy policies, it is necessary to summarize the most important findings about 
Fukushima news coverage in Japan and Germany. 
      Considering Germany to be a special case in regards to its domestic responses to Fukushima in terms of 
changing its nuclear-policy decisions, how did the German media report about Fukushima? In comparison 
to the Chernobyl news coverage, using a quantitative historical approach, Nienierza (2014) found that the 
general frames of both events in German news coverage are almost the same, yet a positive frame of nuclear 
energy existed after Chernobyl, whereas after Fukushima, no positive frame could be found. Wolling and 
Arlt (2014) explained that because the accident in 1986 happened in a technologically less-developed 
country, the effect of Fukushima was much more drastic, as Japan is a technologically advanced country and 
known for its safety measures. Similar to Nienierza, Seiffert and Fähnrich (2014) identified the same anti-
nuclear energy frame after Chernobyl and Fukushima, and argued that the pre-existence of that negative 
frame was responsible in part for the “Fukushima effect,” using a qualitative approach in analyzing German 
newspaper. 
      Hayashi (2013) showed that while Germany’s main television broadcasts featured extensive news 
coverage about the Fukushima disaster, its emphasis was on Japan’s political and social responses along 
with the effects on Germany itself. Moreover, about 40% of the Fukushima disaster news coverage was 
strongly connected to Germany’s domestic political responses, which focused on opposition party and 
governmental opinion from the beginning, increasing from comprising approximately one-third to more than 
half of the main texts of major news broadcasts, suggesting that the Fukushima incident was being closely 
tied to domestic politics in Germany. Judging from those findings, Germany appears to be an anti-nuclear 
dominated society and its anti-nuclear political stance affects public opinion. Arlt and Wolling (2015: 3) 
identified the “Fukushima Effect,” using this phrase to describe “international findings on attitude changes 
towards nuclear power as a result of the Fukushima accident” focusing on political and social responses, yet 
                                                     
4 At the same time, we cannot argue that Japan’s anti-nuclear movements have been necessarily weak. As Honda 
Hiroshi noted, anti-nuclear movements have some impact especially at the local level (2005, 2014). 
5 At the same time, when we focus on the policy level, the Chernobyl disaster has not lead to fundamental political 
change to Japan’s nuclear policies (Wakao & Honda, 2012, Introduction). 
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showed only a moderate impact of Fukushima in terms of attitudes towards nuclear energy based on an 
analysis of German mass media coverage in combination with survey data. 
      Drawing from quantitative and qualitative content analyses as a common tool for media studies, Abe 
(2015) identified the general debate over nuclear energy after Fukushima in Japan as filling the void between 
simple anti- or pro-nuclear energy debates with more nuanced content by identifying in-depth debates about 
nuclear energy in newspaper editorials. Whereas the Asahi and Mainichi advocated denuclearization 
appealing to democratic values and criticizing undemocratic administration of nuclear energy, the Sankei 
and Yomiuri opposed it with technological nationalistic values arguing Japan needs nuclear energy to keep 
its economic- technological leading position in the international society. Abe identified that news attention 
in the context of nuclear energy in the aftermath of 3.11 in the Yomiuri, for example, focused on 
technological-nationalistic attitudes against nuclear phase-out, arguing that Japan’s advanced technology 
was vital to ensure the safety of international nuclear management (Abe 2015: 100). In news items about the 
weekly anti-nuclear movements in front of the Prime Minister’s residence in 2012, and movements against 
restarting the Oi and Sendai nuclear power plants, by using anti-nuclear keywords (datsugenpatsu or 
hangenpatsu), Yoshino (2013: 97) identified major differences between the Asahi, which covered five to ten 
times more news articles in a short one-month period, and the Yomiuri, which appeared to take a stance 
closer to that of the cabinet office and the ruling party DPJ in covering these issues. 
      While studies are focused around the implications of analyzing how the mass media in each country 
reacted in their respective social contexts through international comparison, there is a research gap in studies 
analyzing international news in Japan concerning Germany’s energy policy shift after Fukushima. Our 
analysis shows that the news coverage about Germany’s anti-nuclear energy policy in Japanese mass media 
reflects these general findings, but reveals certain characteristics. 
 
3. Framing the narrative of the Fukushima effect 
 
      While catastrophic events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not constructed, the extent to which the 
nuclear accident was man-made is not addressed here; rather, in order to understand how a natural disaster 
affecting societies is narratively constructed and framed in a media context to make it perceivable and how 
this influences society and politics, is a crucial aspect that needs to be addressed. 
      Nisbert and Newman (2015) define frames as “interpretive storylines” and suggest that defining themes 
influences the amount of attention an issue receives. Members of the public rely on frames to make sense of 
complex issues, and frames found in media coverage influence public opinion as they rely on what they refer 
to as mental models about a certain issue, which in turn define what frames people look at when reading 
through newspapers. Identification of frames by news covering nuclear energy policies and the reaction of 
nuclear- energy-generating countries is crucial when trying to find evidence whether nuclear energy policy 
decisions of other countries in the aftermath of Fukushima could shape Japan’s public opinion on nuclear 
energy and eventually channel international pressure towards political decision-making processes. 
      Nuclear energy, environmental and climate issues are image-loaded topics and the meaning of such 
catastrophic events is constructed by societies and the “process of assigning meaning to an event essentially 
requires the discursive ‘work’ of claims-makers” (Hansen 2010). As natural disasters, earthquakes and 
tsunamis cannot be controlled thus cannot be avoided, but it is possible that nuclear power and energy policy 
can be determined to mitigate the effects of natural disasters in the future. 
      Based on Hansen (2010), considering the “constructed” nature of public communication we find in mass 
media, framing and narrative theory provides fundamentals to analyze and understand why certain issues are 
being recognized over others (2010: 34). Social problems are always subjective and become recognized as 
such only through communication which constructs them as being a problem for public and political concern 
(2010: 14). Analyzing the characteristics of information coverage by mass media over a specific issue and 
finding differences between newspapers, can be analyzed while drawing from the narrative theory approach, 
where the information regarding social relevant issues are put together into a frame according to framing 
theory and build a narrative (story) intended for a certain audience. As each newspaper has its main 
readership, the predefined opinion, in other words mental model as explained by Nisbert and Newman (2015), 
people have about a public issue, influence their choice which information provided by different newspaper 
to follow. 
      After the Fukushima incident, Germany turned back to its recently abolished anti-nuclear energy policy. 
In the following section, we investigate how the influence of this event on Germany’s cause of action 
appeared in Japanese mass media and whether Germany’s political changes show the potential to influence 
Japan’s decision making regarding its nuclear energy policy, an effect we would label the “reverse 
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Fukushima Effect”. 
 
5. Utilizing a mixed methods approach to analyze news coverage of German nuclear energy policy 
in Japanese mass media in the aftermath of 3.11 
 
   (1) Sampling the text data 
      Since the environmental movements of the 1960s, mass media has become a crucial actor in influencing 
political decision-making processes in environment-related topics based on how the environment and 
environment-related issues are presented to and perceived by the public (Hansen, 2010). Mass media can be 
considered as a central channel through which information about other countries reach society and, in the 
context of this research, whether the “Fukushima Effect” eventually had a reverse impact. In this paper, we 
assess how Germany’s sudden shift in its energy policy to become nuclear free by 2022 as a reaction to the 
Fukushima incident was perceived through four major Japanese newspapers: The Asahi (circulation of 6.8 
million for the morning edition and 2.2 million for the evening edition) and Mainichi (circulation of 3.2 
million for the morning edition and 939,000 for the evening edition), known to take an anti-nuclear 
energy/pro- denuclearization stand, and the Nikkei (circulation of 2.7 million for the morning edition and 1.4 
million for the evening edition) and Yomiuri (circulation of 9.1 million for the morning edition and 2.9 
million for the evening edition)6, known to be in favor of upholding nuclear energy technologies in order to 
ensure Japan’s international leading economic-technological role (cf. e.g. Abe 2015, Yoshino 2013). From 
a methodological perspective, our research draws on a combination of content analysis and sentiment 
analysis, and investigates on the one hand how often news articles concerning nuclear power in Japan 
referred to the German case in the six-months period from March 11 to September 11, 2011, and, on the 
other hand, identifies the main policy actors involved and assesses if the coverage was positive or negative. 
      As preparation for the content analysis, we investigated the databases of the four newspapers with a set 
of keywords consisting of “nuclear energy” (genshiryoku) and “political measures” (seisaku) together with 
country names based on the list of nuclear energy generating countries provided by the World Nuclear 
Association7 to get an overview how international nuclear energy policies appear in Japanese mass media. 
Our main interest was to investigate how Germany’s energy policy in the aftermath of 3.11 was perceived 
through Japanese mass media, and thus, we narrowed our results down and focused our attention for the 
content analysis on articles where Germany was mentioned. We chose the time period of March 11 to 
September 11, 2011 as it covers the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear plant accident 
as well as the time frame leading up to the June 2011 legislation to phase-out nuclear power in Germany. 
 
   (2) Qualitative analysis of text data 
      Methodological advice from Charmaz’s (2012) Constructing Grounded Theory, drawing from methods 
based on the grounded theory approach of constructivists on how to analyze a great amount of text data, 
provides us with a heuristically appropriate tool to handle our sampled data in a short period of time. It is 
important to note that we are not building on a theoretical construct and applying it to the data. Rather, we 
draw from communication studies’ framing and narrative theory to explain the results from our coded data, 
which will be explained in the following section. 
      Coding text data in fragments, certain words, lines or segments, to identify the sentiment laying in news 
coverage of the “Fukushima Effect” on an international scale allows us to focus our attention on certain 
issues emerging from the data, identifying the frame and narrative constructed by the newspaper and 
providing us with the possibilities of raising analytical questions. Furthermore, we also considered the 
possibility of finding evidence of international pressure (gaiatsu), which we later call the “reverse 
Fukushima Effect” channeled through mass media. The critically assessed subjectivity regarding this method 
and the problems of assumption-generation on text-data in order to identify latent traits and evaluate their 
“usefulness” in measuring their “real quantities”, our method is validated through the findings by Lowe and 
Benoit (2013), who validated human judgment as a benchmark for qualitative content analysis of political 
text-data, in terms of “semantic validity” and that the quantity being scaled from qualitative and sentiment 
text analyses reflects the quantity that was intended to be measured. While using tools within the analytical 
program NVivo 10, designed for qualitative research, we performed a sentiment analysis through an attribute 
                                                     
6 Reference for newspaper circulation numbers: http://www.kokusyo.jp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/MDK151006b.pdf (access date: 2015/11/30).  
7 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Facts-and-Figures/Nuclear-generation-by-country/ (access date: 
2015/09/17).  
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value matrix query based on our coded content. For this, it was necessary to define attribute values to the 
data. These attribute values basically consist of elements of a coding sheet for newspaper content analysis. 
 
5. Results: Evidence of a “reverse Fukushima Effect”? 
   (1) General findings 
      Table 1 shows the results of performing newspaper article database searches using the methodology 
described in the previous section. In terms of the number of articles overall, three out of the four newspapers 
published over 1,000 articles each during the six-month time period that was reviewed. Among the three, 
the figures for the Asahi and the Yomiuri newspapers are the highest. In all four newspapers, the percentage 
of articles covering Germany in the context of nuclear energy policy was less than 10%, with the Asahi 
having the highest percentage of 8.3% (n=1124) and the Yomiuri having the lowest percentage of 4.6% 
(n=1116), while the Yomiuri has the fewest number of articles (n=941) followed by the Nikkei (n=1005). 
Among all four newspapers, there were few articles that focused on Germany in the context of nuclear energy 
policy. The next four sections describe the article contents, which focused on nuclear energy policy in 
Germany in more detail for each of the four newspapers. Considering the prescribed standpoints towards 
nuclear energy for these major newspapers, the leading role of the Asahi in comparison with the Yomiuri at 
the bottom, represents the general findings of previous studies. The analysis will show, that the nuclear 
energy technology favoring Nikkei with a higher rate of 7.3% (n=73) in comparison with the pro-
denuclearization favoring Mainichi with a rate of 4.9% (n=46), draws from the institutionalized anti-nuclear 
policy of the Green Party in Germany negatively to promote its pro-nuclear energy technology path for Japan, 
what affirms Abe’s findings (2014) about the Nikkei to promote positive aspects of nuclear energy for the 
wealth and stability of Japan. 
 
Table 1 Number of articles in the context of nuclear energy policy and Germany between March 11 
and September 11, 2011 
 
 
 
   (2) Asahi: Reluctantly positive 
      Germany, along with France and the U.S. figured prominently in political reactions to the Fukushima 
disaster as a matter of interest in the Asahi’s news coverage when it assessed changes in international nuclear 
energy policies (or the lack thereof) in the aftermath of 3.11. During the six-month period, we found a total 
of 1,124 articles in the Kikuzo II Visual database (the Asahi newspaper company’s database) referring to the 
issue of nuclear energy and political measures. Slightly less than one-quarter (241 articles out of 1,124) 
referred to nuclear energy in the context of political measures and nuclear energy generating countries. In 
93 articles, Germany’s situation was mentioned, while 22 articles referred to Germany in the context of 
nuclear energy policy as their main theme. The highest numbers of articles compared to the other three 
newspapers as shown in the following sections. 
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Table 2 Attitude towards nuclear phase-out in the context of Germany’s nuclear energy policy shift: 
Asahi 
 
 
      Table 2 summarizes the attitudes towards nuclear phase-out in the context of Germany’s shift in nuclear 
energy policy and how the general view on that topic differs in the Asahi newspaper in comparison to each 
newspaper’s section. In terms of comparability, we labeled the sections for all four newspapers with these 
terms, as the section titles between the newspapers differ. Showing only a small rate of positive agreement 
towards Germany’s political decision to abandon nuclear energy completely as an electricity-supplying 
source of energy by 2022, it is still the highest rate among the four newspapers. The standpoints between 
negative and neutral towards Germany’s political change after Fukushima is somewhat balanced in the major 
sections. This is also evident where the Asahi has a rather balanced coverage between the German ruling 
party (CDU/CSU) and the major opposition party (SPD). 
      While the Asahi implemented expressions describing the legal implementation of the nuclear phase-out 
citing German media, which reflects a rather positive attitude, the narrative of describing the “Fukushima 
Effect” on Germany is reluctantly positive on the one hand, but presenting a rather critical view on the 
question as to whether Japan should pursue a similar path. Major themes such as changes in energy policy 
and the narrative of Germany’s uniqueness in terms of legal fundamentals provided by both the European 
Union as well as domestic politics with the emergence of the Green party in 1980 and the effect of the 
Chernobyl incident of 1986 on political and social attitudes towards nuclear energy are prominent. These 
are experiences that pertain only to the German situation as explained in section 1. The question arose 
whether these fundamental differences, and the attention by the international society towards Japan during 
the Fukushima crisis can eventually channel pressure to promote political and social change. 
      Social responsibility and a strong civil society, a long history of persuasive environmental movements 
in Europe8 in contrast to Japan’s weak civil society as assessed by the Asahi are emphasized when discussing 
the existing fundamentals for successful political change in Germany. Technological capabilities to increase 
the electricity imports as a substitute for electricity supplied by nuclear energy reactors from its neighboring 
countries are seen as a further advantage9. Thus, even though Japan’s responsibility to consider the same 
path as Germany is part of the discussion, the cognitive distance put between them prevents direct pressure 
on politics and society in Japan to supersede Germany in the role of forerunner in energy policy matters, 
noting Fukushima as a chance for change. With 54 nuclear reactors, Japan faces a greater challenge of being 
able to provide substitutes for nuclear energy as its main energy source compared to Germany, which is 
considered to be more likely capable of succeed with its energy shift, having only 17 nuclear reactors to 
substitute with other energy sources and a strong legal framework for renewable energy sources along with 
consensus between the public and the government. In this context, the wide gap between public opinion and 
the government in Japan as a key aspect was supported by a survey conducted by the Asahi among seven 
major nuclear countries (Japan, US, France, Russia, Korea, Germany and China) aiming at assessing 
attitudes towards nuclear energy and its further use after Fukushima10. According to this poll, 73% of the 
Japanese public was against the further use of nuclear power. However, consideration of Germany’s 
historically deep anti-nuclear “green” ideology in terms of environment and energy policies, as well as the 
major role of the German government under Chancellor Merkel (CDU) in strong cooperation with the 
BMUB during the respective time period, provides the ground for successful implementation of a new legal 
framework, which led ultimately to nuclear phase-out. The actual “reverse Fukushima Effect” by Germany’s 
                                                     
8 E.g. Asahi, March 16, 2011.  
9 E.g. Asahi, June 7, 2011.  
10 Published on May 27, 2011. 
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sudden shift in energy policy, is limited to longitudinal economic effects, which was hardly mentioned in 
the Asahi but plays a much greater role in the Mainichi newspaper. 
 
   (3) Mainichi: A hollow frame 
      For the investigation of the Mainichi, we used the Maisaku Mainichi database provided by the Mainichi 
newspaper company. In a total of 941 articles in the context of nuclear energy policy measures, there were 
178 articles focusing on international news coverage of nuclear-energy-generating countries and nuclear-
energy policy measures in the context of 3.11. Roughly one-quarter (46 of 178 articles) mentioned Germany, 
but only 7 articles featured Germany as a main theme. The possibility of a “reverse Fukushima Effect” can 
considered negligible assessing the quantity of the news coverage regarding Germany’s energy policy 
decisions. However, in regard to how previous study positioned the Mainichi in the overall nuclear energy 
debate in Japan together with the Asahi as pro-denuclearization, the results were unanticipated. 
 
Table 3 Attitude towards nuclear phase-out in the context of Germany’s nuclear energy policy shift: 
Mainichi 
 
 
      The articles in the Mainichi appear to have taken a political economic standpoint regarding international 
and domestic political measures on energy policies under the “Fukushima Effect”. Table 3 demonstrates this 
clearly, as the attitudes that arose in the context of Germany’s nuclear phase-out appear to be strongly 
negative. Concern with the economic repercussions for Japan due to Germany’s energy shift, along with 
environmentally strong European institutions on a broad scale, prevent forming conclusions as to a direct 
“reverse Fukushima Effect” in terms of promoting a more robust anti-nuclear energy policy in Japan. 
Moreover, the news coverage of international influence in the Mainichi newspaper is almost non-existent. 
      While former Prime Minister Kan Naoto assessed the possibility of implementing a new energy policy 
framework in early April 2011 11 , the Mainichi emphasized the necessity of fulfilling international 
responsibility towards climate change and decreasing CO2 emissions, noting that Japan depends on nuclear-
energy electricity- generating reactors. Moreover, Japan would have to increase its efforts to fulfill the 2020 
target set by the international society in order to tackle climate change. 
      The Mainichi is similar to the Asahi in referring to the lack of a strong anti-nuclear movement in Japan. 
A few anti-nuclear sentiments in Japanese society can be found, but in general, the articles suggest that there 
is no strong anti-nuclear movement in Japan present to catalyze change, because society does not raise its 
voice12. Nuclear power is discussed in regard to energy policy being strongly connected to the economy and 
is institutionally distant from environmental institutions. This is a major difference compared to Germany 
where nuclear energy regulation has been located in the environmental ministry since 1986. The energy 
ministry’s anti-nuclear policy as defined by the SDP and any capabilities for political change in Japan 
regarding energy policy are topics that were not addressed in the Mainichi articles. However, to pose the 
hypothesis of whether to detect an attitude to change governmental institutions in Japan, the analysis 
provides evidence that the Mainichi promotes the status quo, as its articles appear to favor the economy. 
      As the German government under Chancellor Merkel (CDU) decided to postpone its nuclear phase-out 
policy after successful lobbying by nuclear-energy-generating industries a few months prior to the 
Fukushima accident, which was already defined by the 1998-2005 government of Germany’s SPD/Green 
Party coalition, the nature of the Mainichi’s “Fukushima Effect” regarding Germany may be referencing 
                                                     
11 Issued on April 5, 2011. 
12 E.g. Mainichi, August 7, 2011. 
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how Germany came clear with its antagonistic policy regarding its postponed nuclear phase-out. While 
indicating the required increase of electricity import from its neighboring countries to compensate for the 
lost energy source of nuclear reactors, the Mainichi shows a general skepticism towards Germany’s anti-
nuclear energy policy. Putting pro-nuclear countries in a more dominant position in the context of issuing 
Germany’s energy policy supports a weak image of the German government. This aspect is focused on more 
closely by the Nikkei. 
(4) Nikkei: Strong frame of Germany’s anti-nuclear green party to promote a pro-nuclear path in
Japan 
      The number of articles appearing in the Nikkei is similar to that of the Asahi. We found a total of 1005 
articles using the Nikkei Telecom 21 database. In 73 articles, Germany appeared in the context of nuclear 
energy and political measures, while 18 had Germany as the main theme. Table 4 shows that the Nikkei is 
more reluctant to show a strong attitude towards Germany’s decisions regarding its energy policy under the 
influence of the Fukushima disaster, as the attribute values of the coded content is focused around the 
“neutral” characterized sentiment. Where in comparison the Asahi shows more evidence to be positive and 
the Mainichi to be negative opted. An interesting result is the Nikkei’s attitude in the section “Politics”, 
where the newspaper is divided between positive (17.4%), negative (48.6%) and neutral (34%). 
      In general, the Nikkei shows a strong sentiment towards the major anti-nuclear party in Germany, 
Bündnis 90/Die Grüne, referring on various occasions to one of its founders Jürgen Trittin13 and constructing 
news coverage of nuclear energy policy measures regarding Germany around this image. However, in 
assessing the question whether a fundamental political change would be possible for the high technological 
Japan14, the Chernobyl-experienced Germany with its strong environmental lobby could be compared to 
Japan’s economic lobby in relation to political decision-making processes regarding energy issues. This may 
suggest that similar measures in Japan would require social and institutional changes. 
Table 4 Attitude towards nuclear phase-out in the context of Germany’s nuclear energy policy shift: 
Nikkei 
      While assessing the possibility for the European Union to strengthen its position regarding environmental 
and energy policies towards its member states through Germany’s influential power, strengthening 
environmental anti-nuclear power movements in European politics, the Nikkei emphasizes the effect that 
Fukushima had on anti-nuclear sentiment in supporting parties among European member states, particularly 
in Germany but also in France. Where the Nikkei emphasizes the need to increase electricity imports from 
France and Russia by Germany to compensate for shutting down nuclear reactors and putting the burden of 
increased costs to proceed with its anti-nuclear policy on its neighboring and economically smaller countries 
such as the Czech Republic throughout its news coverage, constructs a negative frame around Germany’s 
energy policy decisions. In addition, the argument of a total nuclear phase-out in Germany would be only a 
label, because a complete phase-out is not possible considering its increased import rate from its neighboring 
countries, supporting our findings shown in table 4. Thus, the positively shaped image through the focus on 
the major anti-nuclear party of Germany must be evaluated with caution. 
      The issue of high costs for political change is a strong frame in the Nikkei, considering the intense 
financial burden for the country due to the Fukushima disaster. Quantitatively similar to the Asahi, the Nikkei 
places more attention towards Germany’s situation under the Fukushima effect but is far more critical in 
assessing its nuclear phase-out. While emphasizing Germany’s cause of action to be no option for Japan due 
13 Since the 1980s, Jürgen Trittin has been one of the main political actors of the Green Party and was a Diet 
member until 2013. 
14 E.g. Nikkei, June 2, 2011. 
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to high costs in terms of energy sources and questioning the actual validity of Germany’s political shift, the 
main frame of the Fukushima effect focuses on Germany’s critical economic situation for both society and 
industry due to the political decision of the nuclear phase-out. However, the framework for a successful 
implementation of its new energy policy fits into Germany, but would not be applicable in Japan. 
(5) Yomiuri: Renewable-Nuclear-Energy mix
Through the Yomidasu Rekishikan database of the Yomiuri, of a total of 1,116 articles, 164 articles
appeared in the context of nuclear energy policy measures taken in nuclear-energy-generating countries. 
Germany appeared in that context in 51 articles, where only 5 had Germany as a main theme, but figured a 
rather neutral/positive attitude towards Germany’s political decisions and is less negative in general than 
findings of previous researches expected. 
Table 5 Attitude towards nuclear phase-out in the context of Germany’s nuclear energy policy shift: 
Yomiuri 
      The results in Table 5 suggest that Germany was not a major issue in the Yomiuri in the respective time 
frame we investigated after the Fukushima disaster occurred and shortly after Germany set its legal 
framework of an anti-nuclear energy policy. In the newspaper articles, mentions of Germany were quite few. 
Thus, the analysis shows attitudes towards Germany’s nuclear phase-out as being generally neutral, if 
mentioned at all, and the role of the “Fukushima Effect” in the discussion is negligible. 
      While the issues of financial burden on the nation to implement its energy policy measures and 
Germany’s anti-nuclear policy-driven influential power on European institutions appeared in the Yomiuri 
(similar to the Nikkei), the Yomiuri put a stronger focus on the topic of renewable energies compared to the 
other three newspapers and emphasized expectations of changes in attitudes towards nuclear energy in Japan 
as well as internationally. Even though the Yomiuri sees validity in pursuing the discussion to eventually 
promote renewable energy in Japan, due to Fukushima’s impact on reconsidering renewable energy 
possibilities on a global scale, it will not become a nuclear free country, considering nuclear disaster 
experienced nations such as the U.S. (referring to the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979) and European 
nations (Chernobyl in 1986) developed nuclear energy technologies as their main energy source15. 
      In general, the issue of nuclear energy safety and pressure from focused international attention towards 
Japan are put in the center of the frame, where international responsibility in terms of measures against 
climate change dominates the discussion. The strong negative amplitude shown in Table 5 in the politics 
section is rooted in a frame where information regarding an anti-nuclear phase-out movement in Germany 
consisting of the nuclear-energy industry (RWE, E.On), diet members within the ruling party (CDU) and 
social movements. But because of the actual strong consensus among politics, society and eventually 
industry in Germany regarding anti-nuclear energy policy decisions, this frame did not appear repetitively. 
The questionable journalistic value of the Yomiuri regarding news coverage in the aftermath of 3.11 previous 
studies assessed, cannot entirely be affirmed, if we compare the framing of the news coverage about 
Germany’s nuclear energy decisions in the aftermath of 3.11 by Yomiuri with the Nikkei or the Mainichi, but 
the little number of articles covering Germany, may present a false image and must be addressed with caution, 
when assessing Yomiuri’s journalistic value. 
      Germany is put into the narrative of renewable energies while pointing out difficulties to implement a 
similar framework in Japan as high costs are involved. Where the Nikkei saw the issue regarding Germany’s 
measures to increase the import rate of electricity from its neighboring countries very critically, the Yomiuri 
15 E.g. Yomiuri, March 25, 2011 15 E.g. Yomiuri, March 24, 2011. 
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saw this option as an advantage to implement a new political framework. Considering the result of 
Fukushima to lead to a complete abolishment of nuclear energy, this would have a great impact on climate 
change. Implementing higher safety measures for nuclear energy is considered to be a more realistic solution. 
6. Conclusion
      Ultimately, the instrumentalized Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear plant crisis propelled the issue of nuclear 
energy policy, including safety, from being a national policy concern to an international topic. During the 
six-months period following the Fukushima accident, Germany became a forerunner in abolishing nuclear 
energy and became an international ideal with its Energiewende. However, in comparison, Japan has not 
taken a similar step. Our findings do not clearly indicate if news coverage of international nuclear power 
decisions exerted pressure on the DPJ’s attempt to abolish nuclear energy or, in the larger picture, canalize 
international pressure on Japan to change its nuclear policy. However, our comparative analysis of the 
coverage in the four Japanese newspapers with regards to Germany and nuclear energy policy show diversity 
in attitudes and opinions in the coverage of Germany’s experience, as well as diversity in the policy 
dimensions in which the topic of nuclear energy policy is discussed. 
      While framing theory suggests a way of constructing a frame of how one event influences how a topic 
is perceived by the audience and eventually affects political decision-making processes, in this case, it might 
be more appropriate to categorize what the frames do not include. When assessing the quantitative news 
coverage of international nuclear energy policies and their influence on attitude change, the level of interest 
among the newspaper readership is a major factor. The research reported within does not address that 
element, and this may be considered a weakness. However, this also suggests a further line of inquiry as 
research progresses in this area. In addition, in terms of assessing the “Fukushima Effect,” the few number 
of articles in each newspaper suggests that the German case was quantitatively not represented strongly 
enough to have a qualitative impact. In fact, if we look at the aggregate number of articles covering the issue 
of nuclear energy policy in general during the six-month period, as well as including those covering nuclear 
energy policy in relation to nuclear-energy-generating countries, the impact rate of news articles covering 
the case of Germany must be considered negligible. This in itself poses a possible future direction in this 
research trend to assess if nuclear power policy is considered to be solely a domestic issue or an international 
issue. 
      In terms of differences among the newspapers in general, while the articles in the Yomiuri and the 
Mainichi did not appear to emphasize news coverage of Germany’s sudden energy transition as a reaction 
to the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear disaster, Germany’s situation was a common thread among the articles in 
the Asahi. Whether this difference could be explained in terms of each newspaper’s ideological background 
(the Asahi is considered to be the most liberal of the four newspapers) is also an avenue for further 
investigation. The critical voice of the Nikkei towards Germany’s shift in abolishing nuclear energy to sustain 
itself through renewable energies, while putting its neighboring countries in a weaker position and forcing 
more burden on them to sustain Germany’s energy demands in the transition phase until it can sustain itself 
with renewable energy technologies, reflects Japan’s cultural and geographical background as an island state 
and its immediate need for self-sustainability. The anti-denuclearization Yomiuri showed a more 
neutral/positive attitude towards Germany’s Energiewende than previous researches suggested. However, 
the negative frame of Germany’s anti- nuclear policies were closely tied to Japan and its lacking capabilities 
to pursue a similar path, while the neutral/positive majored narrative in the Yomiuri emphasized the 
individual position Germany is having, in regards to the different conditions in Japan. 
      In conclusion, our assessment of the frames and attitudes concerning nuclear energy policy in Germany 
as reported in Japanese newspaper articles revealed major differences in the coverage of international energy 
policy and its possible influence on future policy directions in Japan. 
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